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NOTES
A Framework for the Allocation of Prevention Resources with
a Specific Application to Insider Trading
Every society prohibits activities that are detrimental to its general
welfare and, in order to enforce the prohibitions, designs a mechanism to deter individuals from engaging in the activities. Because
such a mechanism consumes societal resources, it is in the best
interests of society that this mechanism operate efficiently, as well as
deter individuals effectively.
A conceptual framework can be helpful in determining the various resource combinations that will deter an activity effectively and in
then choosing the one combination requiring the smallest resource
expenditure. A framework will yield concrete results capable of
being implemented by enforcement agencies only if it integrates the
particular characteristics of both the prohibited activity and the persons who typically engage in it. Since these characteristics necessarily
vary among prohibited activities, enforcement agencies need a
separate, specific framework for each activity in order to ensure
accurate policy decisions. Yet prohibited activities (and the various
groups of typical offenders) also have features in common, and it is
therefore possible to build a general framework that can be modified
for more precise analyses of specific activities.
This Note enumerates and analyzes the three principal forces that
induce individuals to abide by societal laws. These forces, or elements of effective prevention, are then combined to form a framework of general deterrence that both identifies the areas in which
society can introduce resources into the prevention plan and explains
in a general manner what the effect of particular expenditures will be.
In the final section of the Note, the framework is applied to a specific
prohibited activity-insider trading in securities-to exemplify its
utility in determining more effective applications of prevention resources.

J.

THE CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE

The need for a mechanism that deters individuals from engaging
in undesired activities arises from the failure of the private market to
induce an individual to consider the full social cost of an activity in
deciding whether to engage in it. This market failure is a problem
basic to many social concerns. Consider an entrepreneur whose
manufacturing plant spews smoke into the air. His polluting activities
impose significant costs on those living in the vicinity of his plant.
975
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Yet, because these costs do not affect him, the entrepreneur does not
consider them in determining the level at which to operate his plant.
Consider also the bank robber who illegitimately gains $5000 at the
rather insignificant cost of a few hours time, a gun, a ski mask, and
perhaps some forgone earnings from "laying low" for a while. The
bank robber's activity also imposed costs on other persons-costs that
he does not consider in determining the profitability of his venture. In
these and similar cases, the full social cost of the activity is greater
than the private cost that the individual considers in deciding whether
to engage in the activity.
If individuals were induced to consider these external costs, they
would perceive their activities as being less beneficial and therefore
would either discontinue the activities or engage in them less frequently. If the polluter were taxed an amount equal to the external
costs generated by his polluting, his marginal cost of producing each
unit would increase. At this higher schedule of costs, he would
supply fewer goods at any given price and a lower equilibrium output
with smaller total pollution would result. Society could induce the
bank robber to consider the external costs of his activity by employing a deterrence mechanism that would cause him to associate a
higher cost, in terms of fear, potential loss of freedom, and possible
economic loss, with engaging in the activity. If this were done the
robber would discontinue his activity since the costs he would associate with engaging in the activity would presumably equal or exceed
his expected benefits. In short, tlre process of internalizing the external costs of an activity acts to correct ,the market failure and to prevent
the over-allocation of resources to ·the activity that occurs if the
benefits are not juxtaposed with the full social costs.
This correction of the market failure is properly made by society
rather than by any individual because prevention is a "public good";
that is, the benefits from a reduction in the level of an activity enure
to all individuals, and the exclusion of any individual from receiving
the benefits is impossible. 1 Indeed, the internalizing must be conaucted by society since the benefits that would accrue directly to any
individual would be too small to justify bis personal maintenance of
the systems of courts, enforcement agencies, etc., that are necessary for internalization.
Society could internalize simply by imposing upon each violator,
through actual apprehension and punishment, the full social cost of
his undesired activity. The violator who suffers such an internalization would be deterred from engaging in the undesired activity again
because he would perceive that future activities would not be benefi1. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN TllEoRY AND PRACI1CB
52-55 (1973). In fact, it is inefficient to exclude people from using pure public
goods since the marginal benefit of use to each person is always greater than the
marginal cost to society of his use.
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cial for him. Internalization in this manner is termed specific deterrence. 2
Specific deterrence without more, however, does not reduce the
level of an activity to zero since it will not deter first offenders who
are unaware of the practice of internalization. 3 Society can deter an
activity completely, its objective in the case of prohibited activities,
only by employing a general deterrence mechanism that convinces the
individual who has yet to commit his first offense that the offense will
be unprofitable. That is, society must create a threat of internalization, made credible by the actual apprehension and punishment of
past offenders, and communicate that threat to all potential offenders. 4
A general deterrence mechanism is based on the idea that threats
of internalization are necessary to reach the societal objective of a
zero level of prohibited activities. Accordingly, such a mechanism
operates upon the expectations of potential offenders. An individual's motivation for engaging in a particular activity is his expectation
of benefit, whether the benefit be economic or psychological in
nature. If the individual expects no benefit, he will not engage in the
activity since the activity will require positive expenditures of time
and effort. The objective of general deterrence is to develop countermotivations that will offset the individual's expected benefits from
offending. Counter-motivations are expectations of costs (e.g., the
loss of income or freedom) that the individual will associate with
society's reaction (e.g., the imposition of punishment) to his violation. 5
2. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 84 (1974).
3. This statement assumes, of course, that an individual who is contemplating
commission of his first offense is unaware that violators are punished. While unrealistic in its extreme form, this assumption is helpful in isolating the idea that general prevention plans must depend solely upon the manipulation of the perceptions
and expectations of potential offenders.
4. Specific deterrence is not part of a general prevention model since it is concerned only with the deterrence of a specific individual. General prevention and specific deterrence, however, are intertwined since the threats used in general prevention
are credible only when supported by some actual punishments. Actual punishments,
in tum, serve as specific deterrents to the particular offenders who receive them.
5. This conception of general deterrence obviously assumes that individuals are
motivated by "rational self-interest" and, accordingly, balance expected benefits and
costs before acting. Many readers may be unwilling to accept this assumption; few
would disagree that research is needed to determine the psychology of crime. However, some of the disagreement with this assumption may be overcome by taking a
broader view of "rational self-interest." Benefits can be viewed broadly to include
everything from economic benefits to psychological pleasures. Costs can be defined
to include psychological costs, such as embarrassment or the frustrations of discrimination resulting from prior prohibited conduct, in addition to imprisonment terms,
lost income, or fines. Finally, the weighing process can be viewed not as a process
of mathematical summation but rather as a process of resolving conflicting forces-motivations and counter-motivations-that is, conducted subconsciously or con-
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Counter-motivations could be developed by threatening to impose
on :the offender the full social costs generated by his offense. But a
prevention scheme can succeed by creating expectations of costs
sufficient simply to offset the offender's expected benefits. When
these benefits are less than the social costs of the activity, as is often
true in the case of prohibited activities, there is no reason for society
to expend additional resources to create the expectation that the full
social costs of an offense will be imposed. The expenditure of the
additional resources would be inefficient because no social benefit, in
terms of greater prevention, would be gained.
In short, the level of social costs generated by an offense is
irrelevant in determining the level of costs that society should threaten
to impose in order to deter most efficiently. The social cost of an
offense is not totally irrelevant, however, to the development of our
general deterrence framework. Society would incur a net cost if it
spent more on deterring an offense than the benefit-the avoidance
of the offense's social cost-that it gains from successfully preventing
the offense. Thus, the social cost of an offense serves as a ceiling
upon the amount of resources that society should expend to manipulate an offender's counter-motivations.
To be of aid in making resource allocation decisions, a deterrence
framework must incorporate the motivations and counter-motivations operating upon a given potential offender. Ideally, a separate
framework should be devised for each potential offender, but the
costs of doing so are prohibitive and make it necessary to construct a
framework built with a "typical" individual in mind. The typical
individual in the model developed below is assumed to have but a few
general characteristic. He is assumed to be risk averse, 0 motivated
sciously. See J• .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 36. Viewed in this light, the assumption that offenders act in their "rational self-interest" becomes more reasonable.
Furthermore, any model for the allocation of prevention resources must be rooted
in some predictable rule of human behavior since the purpose of such a model is the
determination of the most efficient methods of influencing that behavior. Of course,
present inability to make detailed predictions of deterrent efficacy does not undermine the usefulness of developing and employing the best framework possible.
This Note assumes that societal prevention resources should be used efficiently;
that is, that resources should be expended only if deterrence is possible at reasonable
levels of cost Because the impulsive person cannot be deterred at reasonable cost,
it is irrational to expend resources in an attempt to deter him. Accordingly, impulsive behavior is not taken into consideration in constructing a workable model for
efficient resource allocation. See Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide: I, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701 (1937). The authors admit that "[i]n some
cases, at least, the irresistible character of the impulse is reasonably clear and the
punitive treatment of the individuals involved is, therefore, not required in the interests of deterrence," id. at 757, but they conclude that the conduct of nondeterrablo
persons should still be criminal in order to render them amenable to incapacitativo
and reformative treatment, id. at 759.
6. Risk averseness implies that a higher probability (greater risk) of actual imposition of punishment will have a greater counter-motivating effect than a lower
probability of such imposition. An individual who is risk averse should be distinguished from ~ individual who is risk neutral (i.e., unaffected by changes in tho
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by self-interest,7 and influenced at least to some degree by all the
elements of general deterrence set out below. In particular applications, alterations in the framework can be made to account for the
characteristics prevalent among the typical violators of the particular
law. 8
The framework developed in this Note takes into consideration
the fact that two interrelated resource allocation decisions are at play
in the deterrence context. One allocation decision is made by the
potential offender, who must decide whether the motivations or
benefits from offending exceed the counter-motivations or costs that
he will incur. In attempting to deter, society tries to influence this
decision by manipulating the counter-motivations associated with
offending. If successful, society's intervention will negate the offender's perceived benefit from offending and will induce him to expend
his resources on nonprohibited activities.9 The other allocation decision is made by society, which must determine the kinds and amounts
of resources that should be expended to induce potential offenders ito
engage in nonprohibited activities. Efficiency 10 is society's goal in
making this second allocation decision.
The framework is presented as a mathematical formulation in
order to bring into sharper perspective the various factors entering
into these allocation decisions and to establish their interrelationships
more clearly. The mathematical form is not meant to suggest that all
probability of punishment) or who is risk-preferring (i.e., less counter-motivated by
an increase in the risk or probability of punishment). See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 104-06 (1973).
1. See note 5 supra. This assumption implies that an individual prefers to engage
in an activity with positive net benefits rather than an activity that generates zero
or negative net benefits, where net benefit represents the gap between total motivations and total counter-motivations. It might be argued that economics can say little
about how an individual goes about deciding whether to violate a law or regulation,
but such criticism would be inapposite. Economists do not attempt to say why a person needs two apples to equal his satisfaction from one orange. Instead, economic
theory defers to other disciplines for an explanation of the nature of individual preferences and, taking a particular preference arrangement as given, explains what will
occur when constraints ai;e placed upon individual choice. So, too, economic theory
expects the sociologist and psychologist to determine the reasons why the benefits
from offending take various forms and have varying trade-offs for individual offenders. Economists step in to determine what will occur at the point where, in the mind
of the potential offender, the costs of offending equal or exceed the benefits.
8. See, e.g., text at notes 47-74 infra.
9. This presumes, of course, that the individual has available some other activity
with positive net benefits on which to expend his resources. This assumption is necessary since, if all other activities have 1r
0, the individual will be indifferent as
between the prohibited activity and the alternative activity. Economic theory cannot
predict a choice in this situation. Inactivity is not necessarily a preferable alternative
to prohibited activity because the benefits are zero and the costs in terms of starvation or loss of self-esteem may be considerable. Typically, the assumption that an
alternative activity with positive net benefits is available will be reasonable.
10. Resources are used efficiently when the µiarginal cost of the last unit of resources expended on a project yields an equivalent marginal benefit.
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elements of deterrence can be quantified and measured, for they
cannot. It is used, rather, to indicate the relationships among the
elements. A sum, for example, indicates that the summed factors
each contribute their full measure, independently of the other, to the
prevention of the prohibited activity. A precise quantification of the
factors would be profitable, but the aim of the framework is to
evaluate possible deterrence policies by determining the quality and
significance of the effect of such potential policy changes. 11

II.

A GENERAL FRAMEWORK

This part develops a general framework for the allocation of
resources to the prevention of undesired activities. Subpart A considers the three principal types of counter-motivations. Subpart B
constructs a concrete model of the first resource allocation dec1S1on: the potential offender's decision whether to engage in a
prohibited activity. This model is most accurately called a general
prevention model, rather than a general deterrence model. 12 General
prevention, broader than general deterrence, is the sum of all the
legal and extra-legal forces that induce individuals to be law abiding.
Subpart C completes the general framework by isolating the criteria
that underlie the second allocation decision: society's decision concerning the kinds and amounts of resources to devote to the prevention of offenses.
A.

The Types of Counter-motivations

In deciding whether to commit an offense, an individual considers
both the benefits and the costs that will result from his action. Before
he acts, however, he does not know exactly what the benefits and
costs will be. His decision whether to offend is therefore based on
expectations about the resulting benefits and costs rather than upon
the actual benefits and costs themselves. In analyzing the potential
offender's decision-making process, it is necessary to distinguish between the potential offender's cost expectations, or counter-motivations, and the actual costs, and to focus on the former.
Counter-motivations are of three principal types: primary general deterrence, secondary general deterrence, and socio-pedagogical
influence. 13 It will become apparent as these three types are set out
that the "costs," the expectation of which serve as counter-motiva11. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 6, at 54, 61.
12. See J. .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 7.
13. These labels are only partially in keeping with standard terminology. Tho
term "socio-pedagogical influence" is used and similarly defined by Andenaes, J.
ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 35-36, but his equivalent of "primary general deterrence"
is simply "general deterrence," id. at 174. Andenaes does not apply a specific label
to what is here defined as "secondary general deterrence," although he does recognize
this element as an influence in general prevention. See id. at 24.
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tions, cover a wide range of influences. They include the economic
costs of fines, attorney fees, and forgone income while on trial or in
prison, the more amorphous psychological costs of guilt, frustration,
and fear, and the unpleasantness and loss of freedom resulting from
imprisonment.
Primary general deterrence (D1) refers to the counter-motivations associated with the fine, imprisonment, or other punishment
officially established for violations of the particular law. The kinds
of costs that individuals associate with primary general deterrent
punishments cover a broad range of economic and psychological costs
and vary somewhat among potential offenders for any particular
punishment. The costs of being imprisoned for five years, for example, are perceived differently by different potential offenders. While
more specific research concerning the magnitude of these countermotivations is needed, it can be safely presumed that the magnitude is
positively related to the level of punishment; that is, as the level of
punishment increases, the preventive influence of the punishment
increases. 14
Secondary general deterrence (D2) refers to the counter-motivations associated with the extra-legal sanctions imposed upon offenders. Upon learning of a violation, other members of society may
apply their own ad hoc punishments in the form of stigmatization, the
withholding of employment, or social disapproval. 15 These extra-legal
punishments result directly from the individual's violation of a legal
rule. Unlike the official punishment, however, they are often imposed in the absence of an official determination of the offender's
guilt. Also unlike the official punishment, they are imposed by
individuals rather than by society in a collective action.
The existence and extent of secondary general deterrent costs
depend upon societal and sub-group norms. Other persons will
apply secondary general deterrent punishments to an individual only
if they believe that he merits disapproval; they must be shocked or
frightened by his actions or must believe that his actions were wrong.
A thief, for example, would probably be stigmatized by nonthieves
but would meet with little disapproval from fellow thieves. If fellow
14. See I. ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 61; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note
6, at 89; Kraust, Robinson & Cauthen, Variables That Influence Ethical Risk Taking
Among Convicts, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF nm 80TH ANN. CONVENTION OF TIIE AM..
225, 225-26 (1972).
15. See, e.g., I • .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 24; Special Project, The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970). Some secondary costs, such as attorney fees, are incurred by the offender rather than imposed
on him.
A violation may result in secondary benefits as well as secondary costs. Thus,

PSYCH. ASSN.

a youthful offender may be stigmatized by his parents-a type of secondary costbut admired by his peers-a type of secondary benefit. In the model developed below, D 2 includes only the gross secondary costs, while the gross benefit variable, B,
includes the secondary benefits.
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thieves were the only persons in positions to apply these punishments,
the thief would ·never face these secondary counter-motivations.
Since the effectiveness of secondary general deterrence depends
on the strength of societal norms that accord with and support the
attitude of the law, no legal agency can directly control its application.16 Yet this deterrent influence, virtually costless to the government, can have significant effect on potential offenders.17 Accordingly, legal agencies should make judgments about the existence and
strength of secondary general deterrence and consider it in allocating
prevention resources.
The third and final type of counter-motivation is socio-pedagogical influence (Da). 18 While both primary and secondary general
deterrence involve expectations of both economic and psychological
costs, socio-pedagogical influences are essentially only psychological
costs.
These costs might be described as feelings of guilt or as
desires to follow socially approved rather than disapproved courses of
action. 19 They may be triggered by the commission of an offense,
but they may also arise and have their greatest effect while the
potential offender is deciding whether to commit the offense. For
some individuals, socio-pedagogical influences are so stror!g that they
prohibit the mere contemplation of committing an offense.
Socio-pedagogical influences result indirectly from society's teaching that certain activity is wrong, unfair, or undesirable. This teaching, expressed by the legal and extra-legal punishment of those who
have in the past committed the activity, creates a societal norm that
16. Legal agencies may, however, be able to influence underlying norms. See
text at note 22 infra.
17. Of course, society might decide that, in the interests of rehabilitation, secondary general deterrent influences should be discouraged for certain violators or classes
of violators. For example, the benefit of prevention efficacy arising from expecta•
tions of secondary punishments might be more than offset by the costs associated
with the frustration of society's goal to return offenders to society with regular employment. This frustration of rehabilitation, however, is best handled by treating it
as another cost that must be considered in deciding whether a particular prevention
plan minimizes the social resource cost of prevention.
18. The inclusion of socio-pedagogical influences in this model meets a criticism
leveled by noneconomists against models of prevention that depend solely upon increasing the costs associated with prohibited activities. See, e.g., Sullivan, The Eco-nomics of Crime: An Introduction to the Literature, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 138,
143 (1973 ). These noneconomists argue that it is insufficient to increase the opportunity costs of prohibited activities without altering the individual's "tastes" or "preferences." Socio-pedagogical influences can be seen as both altering "tastes" and increasing costs.
19. Experiments by social psychologists have shown that people's judgments on
such matters as moral issues, aesthetic preferences, and religious questions are
influenced by what they are told is the majority view . • • . It is quite conceivable that one of the functions of the criminal law (even though it performs it
unintentionally) is to inform members of a society of at least some of the moral
attitudes of that society, and so to influence their own moral attitudes.
Walker, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 BR. J. CRIMIN. 570, 570
(1963). See J• .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 35 (punishments and enforcements are
messages sent to teach what is wrong).
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individuals, in tum, tend to follow in their desire to do what is
"right." The norm may be so pervasive that the tendency to avoid
the activity rises to the level of a habit. 20 Such norms are often
supplemented by widely held religious beliefs or beliefs concerning
responsible social conduct. 21
Legal agencies can attempt to strengthen socio-pedagogical influences by generating or augmenting societal norms. 22 The primary
method of doing so is by imposing legal punishments on those who
violate the putative norm and by educating society about the social
undesirability of violations. Resources spent on primary general
deterrence-on imposing legal punishments-should therefore be expended with a view toward maximizing the beneficial impact on
societal norms. Of course, strengthening societal norms also increases
secondary general deterrence since the same set of norms serves as
its basis.
B. A Model of General Prevention
At this point it is appropriate to develop a concrete model that
shows the relationships among the various elements of general prevention and that aids in recognizing points at which society can
expend resources for greater preventive efficacy. As noted above, an
individual will commit an offense only if he perceives that it will
result in a net benefit for him; that is, if he perceives that the benefits
from offending are greater than the costs. This can be conceptualized as
(1)

where
net benefit to be gained if the activity is carried out;
B
motivation or expected benefits;
C = counter-motivations or expected costs.
A deterrent mechanism will be effective only if it reduces 71' to some
value less than or equal to zero; this occurs when the motivations
for the activity are totally offset by the counter-motivations.
Counter-motivations C can now be replaced with the three basic
types of counter motivation: primary general deterrence (D1), secondary general deterrence (D2), and socio-pedagogical influence
1r

=

(Da):
(2)
20. See J. .ANDENAES, supra note 2, at 8; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note
6, at 84.
21. For example, societal norms against littering have probably developed more
as a result of recent social environmental concern than as a result of statutes establishing fines for littering.
22. See generally Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket, in PUBLIC ExPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59, 70-71 (R.H. Haveman & J. Margolis eds. 1970).
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The three added together total the full measure of counter-motivations
since each makes an independent contribution to C. 23 As before,
deterrence will exist when -rr is less than or equal to zero, which
occurs when (01 + D2 + Da) ~ B. Benefit B is an exogenous
variable in this model since the benefit to be gained from a violation
cannot be controlled by legal agencies. Benefit is still defined broadly
to cover any gains, rewards, or gratifications that an individual may
receive from engaging in a prohibited activity. 24
The next step in developing the model is to account for the fact
that potential offenders, in deciding whether to offend, discount the
expected costs and benefits by the probability that they will be
received. When an individual compares the benefits and costs to him
of engaging in a prohibited activity, he typically compares benefits
with possible costs since from everyday observation he knows that
every perpetrator is not caught and punished. Because the individual
does not expect with certainty to receive the potential punishment, its
counter-motivating influence upon him is lessened. 26 In attempting
to quantify the counter-motivations associated with the legal and
extra-legal punishments for a particular offense, it is therefore necessary to discount the punishments by the probability that they will ever
be imposed. 26
Thus, the efficacy of primary and secondary general deterrence
depends not only upon the level of the punishment but upon the
_probability that the punishment will be imposed, which in tum depends upon the kind and amount of resources allocated for the
investigation of violations and the prosecution and punishment of
violators. Socio-pedagogical influences, however, need not be discounted by the probability that they will ever occur since their incidence is unrelated to whether the offender is legally punished. 27
Benefits, like costs, cannot always be expected with absolute
certainty. The variance from complete certainty is most likely to
23. These three elements are added together to achieve total counter-motivations
since they are mutually exclusive as defined. In reality, it may be difficult to determine the proper category for a particular counter-motivating influence, but, so long
as it is placed in only one category, the summation will be correct.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. Research evidence indicates that a greater probability of receipt of punishment will increase counter-motivation and, thus, alter choices. See Mischel & Grusec, Waiting for Rewards and Punishments: Effects of Time and Probability on
Choice, 5 J. PERSONAL11Y & Soc. PSYCH. 24, 28 (1967).
26. Theoretically, time-preference discounting may also occur. In general, in•
dividuals prefer a dollar today rather than a dollar next week; similarly, punishment
in two months or five years has less weight than immediate punishment and so is
less effective in offsetting benefits that will be received presently. The rate of timepreference discounting will vary among individuals. Psychological research on this
point, however, is inconclusive. See Grusec, Waiting for Rewards and Punishments:
Effects of Reinforcement Value 011 Choice, 9 J. PERSONALI1Y & Soc. PSYCH, 85
(1968); Mischel & Grusec, supra note 25.
27. See text at notes 19-21 supra.
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occur when the completion of the violation takes place some substantial period of ti.me after the decision to proceed is made, since it is
harder in such cases for the individual to gauge the plan's prospects
of success. The probability of benefit will, in general, be an exogenous variable, as will be the level of benefit, since it is not controllable
by legal agencies in their prevention plans and must be taken as a
given. In specific cases, agencies may be able to make reasonable
estimates of the probability of benefit as perceived by the potential
offender.
In some cases, the probability of benefit may be influenced by the
probability of detection prior to receipt of the benefit. For example,
a burglar who realizes that he may be caught leaving the scene of his
crime and may lose his stolen goods has a lower perceived probability
of benefit than does the corporate director, unlawfully trading on
inside information, who almost always receives his benefit prior to
detection. In applying the model to specific cases such as burglary,
an appropriate modification should be made.
The expected net benefit28 may now be labeled 71', and the relationship among the elements is
71'

where:
Fb =
FPP
Fps
P
S

Ds

= Fb·B -

(Fpp·P +Fps ·S + Ds]

(3)

perceived probability of benefit;

= perceived probability of punishment;
= perceived probability of secondary costs;
= punishment;
= secondary costs;
= socio-pedagogical influen~es;

(Fpp · P] = primary general deterrence, (D1);
[Fps· S] = secondary general deterrence, (D2);
and by definition, 0 ~ Fb, FPP, Fps ~ 1.
The probabilities inserted into the model are the probabilities
as perceived by the potential. offender (,the perceived probabilities). These probabilities were inserted because individuals rely
upon their own perceptions in deciding whether to offend. The
perceived probabilities may, of course, and usually do differ from the
actual or objective probabilities since potential offenders are usually
not fully apprised of the true level of resource allocation to enforcement efforts.
The difference between the perceived probabilities and the objective probabilities depends largely upon the extent to which investigations, apprehensions, and convictions-the results of prevention resource expenditures---are communicated to potential. offenders. The
28. "Expected net benefit" means the expected value of net benefits and refers
to a weighted average of the motivations (benefits) and counter-motivations (disbenefits) where the weights are the probability of the occurrence of each.
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amount of resources expended on communicating such information
(the c9mmunication factor), therefore, can materially affect the perceived probabilities. Enforcement resources could be utilized in such
a way that every violator was caught and punished. But if this
enforcement efficiency were never made public, potential offenders
would lack a clear understanding of the risks they faced. Similarly, if
successful enforcements or the employment of new enforcement techniques were only sometimes publicized, the individual would underestimate his risk. Legal agencies might cause an overestimation of risk
by very carefully stressing every single enforcement. In short, the
perceived probabilities upon which individuals base their decisions
are functions of the communication factor and the objective probabilities. Accordingly, the variables for prevention policy are the level of
communication and the objective probabilities; that is, society can
alter perceived probabilities by expending more resources on communication and on the apprehension and punishment of offenders.
Communication is in several ways essential for effective prevention. An increase in primary general deterrence, for example, will be
effeotive only if communicated to potential offenders. Communication is clso necessary to support secondary general deterrence and to
establish socio-pedagogical influences since, without communication,
new societal norms will not be developed and existing norms will not
be maintained. Furthermore, the public knowledge of a person's
violation, necessary to trigger the imposition of secondary costs,
would be lacking. Preventive efforts are principally directed at the
individual potential offender, but effective efforts require some interaction between society and individuals and among individuals. Communication is the basic vehicle for facilitating this interaction and
determines the actual effective level of the three elements of prevention. It is therefore an important policy variable.
The objective probability of the primary general deterrent punishment depends both upon the investigative and enforcement procedures employed by society and upon the amount of enforcement
resources society devotes to the detection, apprehension, prosecution,
and punishment of violators. Clearly, for any particular prohibited
activity, this probability will be positively related to the amount of
resources allocated to these efforts. 29
The apprehension and enforcement process consists of a series of
steps, each of which must occur before the legal punishment can be
imposed upon an offender. The probability that an offender will
receive the legal punishment (Fop) is therefore 1:he product of a
series of elemental probabilities each representing the probability that
•a particular step in the procedure will occur. Thus, Fop is a joint
29. Positing this positive relation assumes that the region of diminishing retums
to any or all enforcement efforts has not been reached.
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probability. The first probability in the series-detection, for example--is a simple probability. Each subsequent elemental probability,
however, is a conditional probability since its occurrence depends
upon the occurrence of each prior step. Thus, if apprehension is the
second step in the process, the elemental probability of apprehension
is not the probability that an offender will be apprehended, but rather
the probability that an offender whose offense is detected will be
apprehended. Similarly, if enforcement is the third step in the
process, the elemental probability of enforcement is the probability
that an apprehended offender will have the charges against him
proven.
Because Fop can be viewed as ,the product of a series of elemental
probabilities, society, in an effort to increase the number of offenders
punished and thus the preventive influence of primary general deterrence, could choose to devote additional resources to increasing any
of the elemental probabilities. If society expends all of its additional
resources to increase only one probability, however, primary general
deterrence will not be increased because the subsequent probability in
the series will decline, For example, an increase in the probability of
apprehension will not increase primary general deterrence if enforcement resources are being fully utilized and resources are unavailable
to bring to trial the additional offenders apprehended. As more
offenders are apprehended while the same number of offenders are
convicted, the probability of enforcement will decline and may offset
the rise in the probability of apprehension. Thus, it would clearly be
more efficient for society to add additional resources to each step in
the process since only this method of allocation ensures an over-all
increase in primary general deterrence. Any other allocation approach effectively creates bottlenecks in the enforcement process.
With this caveat in mind, Fop can be replaced with a product of
elemental probabilities. The precise choice of elemental probabilities
to include in the general model is somewhat arbitrary since the
probabilities vary in importance with the prohibited activity under
consideration. The probability of enforcement (Foe), which includes the probability of proving a case or establishing a cause of
action, is a basic variable for most offenses and should clearly be
included in a general model. The selection of other variables is more
arbitrary for they may or may not be important in a particular
application of the model. For example, in the case of murder or
robbery, the probability of apprehension of the violator is probably
the most important variable in resource allocations because it is likely
to be highly elastic with respect to new inputs. The probability of
detection of the violation, however, is likely to be naturally close to
one and hence inelastic with respect to additional inputs. In the case
of insider trading, both the probability of "discovering a violation and
the probability of determining the violator's identity may be very
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elastic with respect to additional resource input. 30 The probability of
discovery (Fod) and the probability of enforcement (Foo) are included in the general model as the most efficient points for resource
allocation with the understanding -that other variables may be substituted or added when the model is applied to a particular offense.
Secondary general deterrent punishments are triggered by the
same resource expenditures that trigger primary general deterrence. It
is the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of violators that creates the scandal and draws the attention of the peers,
employers, and friends who impose these secondary punishments.
Thus, the probability of secondary general deterrence (Foe), like the
probability of primary general deterrence, depends upon the elemental probabilities of successful completion of the steps in enforcement,
Fod and Foe, However, it depends upon them in a significantly
different manner. Fos is the sum of Forl and Foe, rather than the
product, because the event of discovery alone, coupled with communication, can bring about secondary punishments: Full enforcement
is not a sine qua non to secondary counter-motivations, 81 although the
enforcement of a case to judgment or conviction does increase their
force and their probability of occurrence. Thus, it is the combination
of the two events, their sum, that determines Fos,
The probabilities in relation (3) can now take on a more explicit
form:

where
k
Fop
Fos

k · Fop

(4)

k 'Foe

(5)

communication factor, which is variable;

= objective probability of primary general deterrent punishment;
= objective probability of secondary general deterrent

punishment.
By substituting in the basic elemental probabilities of discovery and
enforcement, (4) and (5) become
FPP
Fps

= k(Fod • Foe)
= k(Fod + Foe)

(6)
(7)

30. In a civil suit apprehension is not necessary; judgment for damages may be
established without the individual's presence. However, successful enforcement of
judgment will be necessary.
31. Because every step in the enforcement process is not necessary to trigger secondary punishments, alterations in procedural and investigative techniques will have
greater impact on the counter-motivations arising from secondary general deterrence
than on the counter-motivations arising from primary general deterrence. An individual will perceive that he might receive secondary punishment even though the en•
forcement procedure beyond the discovery stage breaks down.
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where
Pod
objective probability of discovery;
Foe
objective probability of enforcement.
The relationships among the elements of prevention as expressed in
(3) now become more explicit:

=

=

= Fb • B -

+

+

+

[k(Fod • Foe)P
k(Fod
Foe)S
Da]
(8)
The final factor in ithe model, socio-pedagogical influence (Da),
requires a more concrete formulation before the model can be em~
ployed. Effective prevention, or at least its development, is a dynamic
process. Socio-pedagogical influence is clearly the most dynamic
element in the model since its development depends upon the pattern
of resource allocation over long periods of time. 82 By definition,
socio-pedagogical influences presently associated with a particular
activity depend upon past enforcement and punishment patterns for
·that activity since the punishment of offenders is society's principal
teaching mechanism.
Past punishment levels and society's past enforcement efforts are
,therefore important factors in determining socio-pedagogical influences. These factors convey to individuals society's relative ranking,
in terms of social undesirability, of each prohibited activity among all
the activities it has prohibited. This item of information is instrumental in developing norms or attitudes toward the prohibited activity
and in creating the individual's barrier to contemplation of the activity.
The punishment level and enforcement effort level for a particular
offense interact to indicate society's relative ranking of the offense.
This interaction can be demonstrated by imagining a coordinate
quadrant, as in Figure 1, where each point represents a possible
combination of a punishment level and an enforcement resource
allocation level. Points A, B, and C represent three prohibited activities. A set of social indifference curves33 can be imposed upon the
quadrant with each curve plotting offenses that are equally disapproved by society. Offenses A and B may be ranked equally even
though B is punished at a higher level than A, while society expends
more enforcement resources on A than on B; both levels must be considered to determine how society ranks an offense. Those points lying
on indifference curves farther from the origin represent activities con7r

32. See text at notes 18-22 supra. Socio-pedagogical influences may be reinforced by secondary as well as primary general deterrence and, in tum, socio-pedagogical influences will affect secondary general deterrence by teaching people to
stigmatize violators. Judgments as to the extent of this interrelationship are best
made in specific applications of the model.
33. :Indifference curves indicate preference rankings. Although only three curves
are shown, there are, in fact, an infinite number establishing the ranking of all points.
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Figure 1

ENFORCEMENT
LEVELS

►

PUNISHMENT
LEVELS

sidered more onerous by society. The whole series of indifference
curves represents society's total ranking of all prohibited activities. 84
As demonstrated by the indifference curve analysis, an individual
can tell little about the relative undesirability of an offense just by
looking at the absolute levels of punishment and enforcement for that
offense. A fine of $500, for example, has one meaning if ninety-five
per cent of all other offenses are punished by a term of imprisonment
and a different meaning if ninety-five per cent of all other offenses are
sufficient resources to apprehend and punish half the individuals who
commit a certain offense. The significance of this fact will vary
depending upon whether society, on the average, expends resources
punished by a fine of less than $500. Similarly, society may expend
sufficient resources to apprehend and punish half the individuals who
commit a certain offense. The significance of this fact will vary depending upon whether society, on the average, expends resources sufficient to apprehend and punish twenty per cent of all offenders or
eighty per cent of all offenders. Thus, society's message as to the
undesirability of an offense is much clearer if the enforcement effort
level and punishment level for the particular offense are compared
with the average levels for all offenses.
It is appropriate at this point to begin to formulate the sociopedagogical influence factor more concretely. In the model as developed so far, Fop represents the objective probability that an individual
34. See E. SUIBERLAND,

ON ANALYZING

CRIME 76-77 (1973).
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who commits a particular offense will be punished. The relative
enforcement level of a particular prohibition can therefore be expressed as Fop/Fop, where Fop is the average enforcement probability for all offenses. The ratio Fop/Fo1, may be termed Re. In a
similar manner, it is possible to formulate more concretely the relative
punishment level for an offense. In the model above, ·P represents
the punishment level for an offense. If P is the average punishment
level for all offenses, the relative punishment level for an offense become P/P. The ratio may be called Rp. 35
These ratios together indicate the societal dispreference for an
offense36 and thus serve as society's teaching message for the development and maintenance of socio-pedagogical influences. Since Re
and RP each convey a message to individuals, ,the total message is
the sum of the two: 37
Message = (Re
RP)
(9)
It might be argued that enforcement levels are a more effective message than punishment levels, 38 and hence that ( 9) should be a
weighted sum. Whether enforcement levels are more effective than
punishment levels is an empirical question, however, and is more
appropriately taken into consideration in applying the general model
to specific offenses. As used in this model, the summation indicates
simply that the total message is given by the two parts acting together.
Consideration again must be given to the fact that potential
offenders are not fully apprised of the activities of enforcement
agencies and thus base their decisions whether to offend on their own
perceptions of those activities. Socio-pedagogical influences are
therefore dependent not upon the message actually created by society
but rather upon the portion of that message communicated to individuals. This may be called the effective message, which will be some
multiple or proportion, k, of the actual message, where k represents
the communication factor and O ~ k. None of the message, some of
the message, or all of the message may be communicated as k varies
from zero through one. It is also possible to publicize enforcements,
investigations, etc., so strongly and repeatedly that the effect of
the message is multiplied, in which case individuals will view the
offense as relatively more onerous than society views it. In this case
k would be greater than one.
Effective communication, k, will be a function of several varia-

+

35. Fop and P will also be averages since the enforcement resources and penalty
will rarely be identical for every violation of a given law but will vary over some
range; the Fop and P representative of a given activity would typically be the average.
36. Individuals may perceive the rankings of offenses somewhat differently, for
they will combine the message received from society with their existing religious and
ethical views and their views about socially acceptable conduct. Yet, these individual
differences are apt to average out so that we can state as a generalization that sociopedagogical influence is some function of the above-described ratios.
37. See text at note 11 supra.
38. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. EcoN. 169 (1968),
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bles, most of which are exogenous, such as the existence of news
media, the media's attitude toward disseminating such information,
and the number of occurrences that trigger dissemination. A triggering occurrence might be a successful enforcement, the imposition of
an unusual punishment, or the passage of a new law or regulation.
Effective communication will be positively related to the incidence of
these occasions that trigger discussion or media coverage. Enforcement agencies might increase communication by creating triggering
occasions in the form of press releases about new levels of enforcement resource expenditures or procedural changes that permit easier
enforcement. 39
The message actually communicated to individuals can be represented as:
Effective Message (M) = k(Re Rp),
(10)
The k factor thus determines whether an effective message will be
nonexistent, widely communicated, or somewhere in between. The
effectiveness of the message depends in part upon the nature of the
prohibited activity. An activity may be such that the only occasions
that trigger communication are successful enforcements. If Ro for
the activity is extremely low so that enforcements are rare and communication, consequently, is sporadic, M for the offense might approach zero even ·though RP for the offense is positive or even high.
At any given time, t, there will be an existing level of sociopedagogical influence at work in the society. That level will be some
function of the norm-developing messages communicated in the past
by enforcements and punishments. However, socio-pedagogical influences will be a function not of the total effective message sent out
in each prior time period,40 but rather of the changes in the content
and intensity of the message that have occurred over time. It is the
alterations in the effective message, caused either by changes in the
Re and RP ratios for the offense or by changes in the effectiveness
of communication, that both reflect changes in society's disapproval
ranking of the prohibited activity and indicate changes in the norms
that society wishes to foster. Thus, the socio-pedagogical influence
(Da) in any time period tis some function, f, of the changes in the
message it:hat were made in the prior period plus the level of Da that
was operating in that prior period. This can be expressed as:

+

-

Dat- D31;_1

oM)
+ f QM
~k + oM
~ + ~
t-1

et-1

Pt-1

(11)

39. Because effective communication and enforcement levels are neither function•
ally related nor dependent upon the same factors, they will not move together. Communication may be increased by triggering occasions, but R. depends upon enforcement resource allocation, not the number of successful enforcements.
40. This total message merely reinforces present levels of D 8 •
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where

1r
f~r
~

~ t-1
t-1

~~ t-1 +

+

:~ )
Pt-1

= the change in message in time t-1;

~~ + ~~ ) = ADat-i•

+

8

t-1

the change in socio-pedagogical influence between times t
and t-1.

Pt-1

But,
oM + ;rn:oM)
+ f~M
~ k + on

D 8 t-l - D8t-2

t-2

~t-2

(12)

Pt-2

Thus, socio-pedagogical influence at any time t is the sum of the
ADa's from all prior times: 41
D3

t

=S.ttf[okoM

dk +
dt

O

oM dRe+ oM dRPJdt
oRe dt
oRp dt

(l 3 )

From (10), we know

= k·'

oM
oRe

oM
oRe

= k·'

oM ok

(R + R )
e
P •

Therefore,
Dat

s:t~E!~9

k~~~9

+

+ (Re + Rp)

~~ jdt

(14)

The model thus suggests that socio-pedagogical influences at any time
are a function of the sum of past changes in society's rankings of the
prohibited activity to the extent that ,they are communicated,

k0~~ +

kE:~~• and the increase or decrease in the portion

of the message existing at any time that is effectively communicated,

[(Re

+ Rp)~f].

This model of the development of socio-pedagogical influences
over time indicates clearly that enforcement and punishment efforts in
any period are both a present consumption, in that they contribute to
current prevention efficacy, and an investment, in that they yield
returns in the form of {uture prevention efficacy. In considering
whether punishment and enforcement policies will be sufficiently
beneficial to justify their costs, it therefore is important to consider
the investment returns on the current expenditures.
.

oDa oM oM oM

41. Assuming .lM, -R, -R, u

O

O

O

p

Ok

> O.
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By substituting (14) into (8), the final form of the general
framework is obtained:
7r

where

= Fb · B -

~(Fod 'Foe)P + k(Fod+Foe) S +

J,f~0f + :-J + (R, + R;)~f])

Resource input point ( 1)
Resource input point (2)
Resource input point (3)
C.

=
=
=

(15)

P;

Fod, Foe;
k, dk
dt.

Implications of the Model and Completion of the Framework

The model of general prevention just developed places the elements of prevention into perspective and identifies the resource input
points. In so doing, it facilitates determining how resources, added
at given resource input points, influence the individual's resource
allocation decision. There are three resource input groups: (1)
resources necessary to apply the legally designated punishment, such
as the costs of maintaining a prison system or of imposing fines; (2)
detection, enforcement, and prosecutorial resources, which directly
determine the objective probabilities of apprehension and punishment; and (3) resources expended upon effective communication and
publicity, which directly contribute to the perceived probabilities and
facilitate the development of socio-pedagogical influences. The general model indicates that these three resource input groups potentially
have multiple outputs in the total prevention plan. Resources added
at the first input point contribute both to primary general deterrence
and to the message for socio-pedagogical influences. Resources added
at the second point strengthen primary and secondary general
deterrence and are also a portion of the socio-pedagogical message.
Resources added at the third point alter the perceived probabilities of
primary and secondary general dete.rrence and control the effectiveness of the socio-pedagogical message, which is created by the expenditure of resources at the first two points.
The model also indicates certain bottlenecks in a total prevention
plan that affect the efficiency of particular resource uses. Resources
devoted to the maintenance of punishments and to the development
of objective probabilities will be much less productive without effective communication. Without the expenditure of resources to maintain significant objective probabilities, the maintenance of institutions
for imposing punishments, such as prisons, may consume resources
while hardly benefiting prevention efficacy. Efforts to increase a
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particular elemental probability, which would contribute to the total
objective probability that primary general deterrent costs will be
imposed, will be inefficient if the other elemental probabilities are
extremely low. 42 These observations suggest limitations upon the
range of resource combinations that will efficiently contribute to a
prevention plan.
Finally, the model shows that prevention resource expenditures
contribute to both present and future preventive efficacy. Resources
allocated to implementing punishments and developing objective
probabilities have immediate preventive effects and, in addition, yield
future returns in so far as they develop the norms underlying sociopedagogical influences. A communication system designed to maintain the effectiveness of socio-pedagogical influences is an investment.
This interaction of present and future benefits indicates the importance of long-range planning and the need ;to consider future returns
when deciding whether a resource use will produce benefits •sufficient
to justify its cost.
The model takes on its full predictive powers only when, for the
prohibited activity under consideration, empirical assumptions are
made about the elasticity of total counter-motivations (C) with respect to each of the variables-communication, objective probabilities, punishment levels, etc. The making of assumptions essentially requires a determination of the most influential variables, those
variables that will cause the greatest increase in C for a given resource
input. Variables ·that cause a greater change in C will Teduce 7r to
zero more efficiently-that is, with less resource cost.
It is at this point appropriate to complete the framework of
prevention resource allocation by considering more concretely the
second resource allocation decision of concern in the framework-the
efficient allocation of social resources to prevention. While the discussion thus far has focused on placing the individual's allocation
decision in a more concrete form, it has indirectly dealt with the
question of efficiently allocating prevention resources. Thus, while
equation (15) is an embodiment of the individual's allocation decision, it is also the objective function for societal resource allocation;
society desires to reduce (15) to zero. Furthermore, the concrete
form of the general prevention model facilitates recognition of the
resource input points and indicates the multiple impact of some
resource inputs.
The objective in developing this framework for the allocation of
prevention resources is not to determine how to prevent a person from
engaging in a prohibited activity at any cost, but rather to plan an
effective prevention mechanism at the lowest possible social cost.43
42. See text following note 29 supra.
43. "Social cost" includes the expenditure of all social resources, both tangible
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The goal in using the framework, accordingly, is to minimize social
costs, K, subject to the constraint that 7r = 0, that is, that the typical
individual is deterred. Although deterrence also exists at 7r < 0, it is
inefficient to expend resources to achieve that result if persons are
effectively deterred by nullifying their benefits.
The minimum cost necessary to achieve effective deterrence, determined from the general prevention model, may be unreasonably
high for a particular offense. There will be some maximum cost, K*,
that society is willing to incur to achieve effective prevention. That
maximum cost will presumably be the social harm that would result
from the occurrence of the prohibited activity, since a society will not
want to expend more resources on preventing an offense than the
resource cost it would incur if the offense were committed.
Society has two possible options if the minimum cost of effective
prevention exceeds K*. One option is to forgo spending resources on
prevention and, instead, spend resources on redressing the injuries of
the offense victims. The other option, which may or may not be
feasible, is to devise a resource allocation plan with the objective of
deterring only some of the potential offenders. The general prevention model developed above assumes one typical individual who
decides whether to violate a particular proscription. But some pro•
hibited activities may actually have subgroups of violators, each with
its typical representative, who may be more susceptible to societal
prevention efforts than the offender that is typical of all violators of
the offense. In such instances, it may be possible to design prevention plans at less than K* costs to deter members of such subgroups
while other potential violators go undeterred. Thus, the purpose of
this second option is to discover "cheaper prohibited act avoiders."
The individual who is influenced only by a full-time policeman at his
elbow is left to engage in prohibited activity, although obviously this
fact is not announced to him.
The model of general prevention indicated that prevention expenditures are an investment as well as a present consumption. This
in turn implies that consideration must be given in resource allocation
decisions to the future returns on the investment. To avoid eroding
an investment built over time and capable of yielding future returns,
prevention policy decisions should be made so as to avoid reducing
existing levels of socio-pedagogical influences. It is likely that any
resource savings resulting from a decision not to maintain existing
socio-pedagogical influences would be less than the future returns
that could be expected from Da. 44
and intangible. Intangible costs might be human suffering or the lowering of ethical
standards.
44. This assertion may not be true for all offenses and, indeed, is merely a rebuttable presumption in the absence of empirical data for specific activities. Thus, in
allocating resources for the prevention of all prohibited activities, it might properly
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Socio-pedagogical influences are eroded by any negative change in
D3 over a time period. The requirement that a prevention plan not
erode D3 can therefore be expressed as a final constraint on the
framework: The change in D3 ( b.D3) must be greater than or
equal to zero. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that this
constraint does apply.
In its final form, the general framework for the allocation of
prevention resources can thus be formulated as follows:
Costs (K) must be minimized subject to the requirements, that
( 1) ,,. = 0 ( deterrence be achieved)
(2) k

E:~e + :~P1 + Qle +

R~

~~> O(socio-pedagogical in-

fluences not be eroded)
and, implicitly,
(3)

K ~ K* (the resource cost of deterrence be less than the resource cost associated with occurrence of the offense).

ill. SPECIFIC .APPLICATION
In this part, 1:he usefulness of the general framework in making
resource allocations is illustrated by applying it to a specific problem-insider trading in corporate securities.45
A. An Overview of Insider Trading
Insider trading refers to the use of nonpublic information46 in
purchasing or selling personal holdings of corporate securities so as to
make a profit or to prevent a loss. 47 Typically, this trading is done
by corporate officers or directors in the securities of their own firms,
be concluded that more social benefit could be gained from allowing the erosion of
socio-pedagogical influences· for activity A and allocating the freed resources to the
prevention of activity B.
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970), represents
a congressional determination that insider trading should be prevented. That provision was based on the belief that efficiency in the capital markets is furthered by
investor confidence, which is prompted through fair markets without insider trading.
See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934).
Some commentators argue that insider trading furthers market efficiency because
it results in the more accurate and rapid market reflection of actual stock values. See
H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND TIIE STOCK MARKET (1966); Wu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260
(1968). A societal desire to prevent insider trading is presumed in this Note, as is
the existence of sufficient social costs associated with unrestrained insider tradjng to
justify the use of resources in its prevention. This, of course, does not mean that
any amount of resource cost would be justified.
46. Such information may include, for example, news of a forthcoming merger,
a tender offer, unusual earnings figures, or the development of a new product.
47. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); w. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
2-3 (1968).
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but any person profiting through trading in the stock of any corporation by using nonpublic information is an inside trader. 48
Present regulation and enforcement policies concerning insider
trading are contained in sections 16 and 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,49 SEC rules 16(a), 16(b), and lOb-5 60 and the
relevant SEC and court interpretations. 51 Under section 16(b), any
officer, director, or controlling shareholder of a corporation who sells
and purchases (or purchases and sells) stock of his company within a
six-month period is conclusively presumed52 to have traded on the
basis of inside information and is held liable to his corporation for the
profits he realizes and the losses he avoids. Section lO(b) and rule
l0b-5 are broader and more imprecise than section 16(b): They
prohibit fraudulent and deceitful activities in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 53 In general, section 16(b) protects
a corporation and its shareholders against insider trading by the
corporation's officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, while
rule 10b-5 protects investors against insider trading in general. 64
Due to its relatively unambiguous design and its lack of any
scienter requirement, section 16(b) serves as a stiff deterrent for a
very limited portion of insider trading. The objective six-month test
allows plaintiffs to avoid the problem of proving that a defendant
officer, director, or ten-per-cent shareholder made actual use of any
inside information available to him. Section 16(a)56 facilitates the
enforcement of 16(b) by requiring each individual, upon becoming
an insider, to report any holdings of his company's securities and to
report any changes in those holdings each month. Enforcement is also
facilitated by a provision allowing either the corporation directly or its
48. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 2-3.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), 78j (1970).
50. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1 to -10 (1974); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to -11
(1974); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974).
51. Where broker-dealers are involved, a rule lOb-5 claim is usually joined with
claims under rule 15cl-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1974), or Section 17(a) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), for good measure. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1449 (student ed. 1961).
52. Exceptions to this objective test have been promulgated to avoid automatic
liability where a conclusive presumption would be harsh and disrupt market functions.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16b-1 to -11 (1974).
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
54. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 8-23.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1038-40.
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shareholders derivatively to sue for the insider's profits, 56 and by the
judicial abrogation of both security-for-expenses requirements 57 and
requirements that the plaintiff be a stockholder at the time of the
wrong. 58 To provide an additional incentive for the civil enforcement of section 16(b), courts allow plaintiffs to subtract counsel fees
from the recovered profits in amounts ranging from one-quarter to
one-half of the total. 59
Thus, section 16(b) has been designed to ensure its vigorous
enforcement. Perfect ease of enforcement has been hampered, however, by interpretative uncertainties that remain. In particular, it is
unclear whether the terms "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase"
cover unusual situations such as the conversion of preferred stock or
stock exchanges occurring in connection with mergers. 6° Courts
apparently follow one of two approaches in deciding whether a
transaction is a "purchase and sale'' for ,the purpose of section 16 (b).
The objective approach-applying the section in a mechanical manner even where no wrong is apparent-is based on the theory that
Congress accepted the danger of subjecting the innocent to 16(b)
liability in order to obtain maximum deterrence. The pragmatic approach-applying 16(b) only to those transactions involving some
actual danger of abuse of inside information-has also been followed. 61 Uncertainties such as this have tempered the strong prevention influence embodied in the section's mechanical six-month test.
Rule lOb-5, the basis today for a broad and uncertain concept of
insider liability, was originally conceived as a general anti-fraud
provision without any particular application to insider trading. 62 The
rule standing alone therefore did not have a preventive effect upon
insider trading until courts decided to specifically apply it to insider
trading and concluded that the rule provided individuals with a private
damage action for violations of its prohibitions. 63 In the 10b-5 con56. Shareholders must first request that the corporation bring the suit. If it fails
to do so within 60 days, the shareholders are automatically free to begin the derivative suit. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
57. See I.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964); W. PAINTER, supra
note 47, at 15.
58. See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1046.
59. See id. at 1052; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 385, 421-22 & nn.142-43 (1953).
60. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 42.
61. See id. at41-52; id. at 10-14 (Supp. 1974).
62. Id. at 19.
63. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971);
I.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73
F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Note, SEC Rule JOb-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM.
& MARYL. REV. 860, 866 (1972). The courts have justified the implication of private causes of actions in securities regulation by the need for more enforcement than
the SEC can provide. See, e.g., I.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964);
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Co., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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text, courts expanded the narrow definition of insider trading contained in 16(b) in order to cover situations in which material, nonpublic, corporate information is used by any individual to disadvantage
others in securities trading. 64 In devising the 10b-5 cause of action,
courts eschewed requiring plaintiffs to comply with the traditional
elements of a common-law fraud action6~ and allowed plaintiffs to
recover attorney fees. 66 In so doing, they in effect enlisted private
plaintiffs to supplement SEC enforcement efforts and thereby subjected insiders to the dangers of incurring huge liabilities to large
numbers of investors. 67
Section 16(b) and rule lOb-5 have thus, over the past several
decades, taken different approaches to the problem of insider trading.
Section 16 (b) has dealt with a very limited portion of insider
trading by using a conclusive rule of liability and strong inducements
to civil enforcement. Rule 10b-5 has dealt with the amorphous body
of all insider trading via a case-by-case development of preventive
influences. Because of their differences, 16(b) and l0b-5 can be
viewed as comparative experiments in the prevention of insider trading. The data from these experiments can be used both to discover
the effectiveness of past resource allocations and to determine whether
resources might be better allocated for more effective prevention of
insider trading.
B.

Characteristics and Motivations of the Typical Offender

Before considering insider trading in light of the general framework, it is appropriate to analyze the motivations of the "typical"
inside trader that must be offset through the utilization of prevention
resources. The essential characteristic of the potential inside trader is
64. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); W.
PAINTER, supra note 47, at 118, 222-23.
65. See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1435; The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86
HARv. L. REv. 50, 260 n.2, 270 (1972). The exact parameters for fraud that have
been worked out in lOb-5 actions are not entirely clear. The reliance requirement
of common-law fraud has apparently been weakened so as to approach a presumption
of reliance in nondisclosure cases or situations of impersonal fraud on the market.
See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule l0b-5, 88
HARv. L. REv. 584 (1975); Note, supra note 63, at 885-95. There has been relaxation of both scienter and materiality ,:equirements, see Note, supra note 63, at 86785; but see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. March 30, 1976)
(No. 74-1042), and causation in fact, rather than the more stringent proximate cause,
has been found adequate, see Note, supra note 63, at 892-99. Similarly, it is enough
that the fraud occurred in connection with a purchase or sale; strict privity is not
required. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
66. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (misleading
proxy solicitation).
67. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule l0b-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 385 (1974).
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that he is capable of being deterred by affirmative enforcement
policies. Recorded incidents of individuals who chose not to trade on
inside information68 and of corporations that promulgated new disclosure policies and adopted intra-corporate sanctions for abuse of
inside information69 make it difficult to contest the notion that some
deterrence of insider trading is possible.
As noted above, an inside trader is any person who obtains
material nonpublic information about a corporation and proceeds to
trade in that corporation's securities without first publicly disclosing
the information. This definition potentially covers a broad range of
people. Generally, however, the prevention system can be tailored
for inside traders who are either corporate directors, controlling
shareholders, top-level corporate managers, or members of the financial community who serve corporations as broker-dealers, underwriters, or analysts. Such individuals are likely to be executives or
professionals from middle or upper socioeconomic groups. According to a survey by the Harvard Business Review, this means that their
ethical decisions may be strongly influenced by their personal codes
of behavior70 and that they may view a high probability of detection
and punishment as an important counter-motivator. 71 These generalizations have several ramifications. First, inside traders may be
strongly affected by socio-pedagogical influences if such influences
can be well developed through clear definitional statements of the
prohibited activity. 72 Second, in the development of socio-pedagogical influences, the most important element of the message, M, is likely
to be Re-the willingness of society to invest resources in punishing
68. For example, one officer of the failing Penn Central Railroad refused to sell
the stock that represented nearly his entire personal fortune before its market price
plummeted from $88.50 to $10 per share. Although he seems to have been deterred,
one of his colleagues apparently was not: He traded and then attempted to cover
his violation by requesting his bank to pretend to force his sale of stock to cover
a loan. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 2 (late city ed.). In another case,
a securities analyst, after receiving potentially material inside information, refused to
reveal it to a customer. Influenced by then current proceedings in the Equity Funding scandal, he felt it would certainly be considered a misuse of nonpublic material
information. See Wall St. J., June 7, 1973, at 6, col. 3 (eastern ed.). At _least one
commentator has concluded that "white-collar crime" is more easily deterred than
other crime. See Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 703, 712-14.
69. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 29, 1965, at 45, col. 7 (late city ed.); Wall St.
J., Oct. 8, 1969, at 15, col. 1 (eastern ed.); id., May 4, 1965, at 16, col. 3 (eastern
ed.); id., April 27, 1965, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.).
70. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REV. 6, 19, 156,
158 (July-Aug. 1961). Although these generalizations are plausible, sufficient empirical data do not presently exist to verify them completely.
11. Id. at 19. It is still possible that business executives are less counter-motivated by any given probability than other individuals since there is some very limited
evidence that business executives may be more risk-preferring than other types of administrators. See Brown, Risk Propensity in Decision -Making: A Comparison of
Business and Public School Administrators, 15 Al>MIN. Ser. Q. 473, 476 (1970).
12. See Baumhart, supra note 70, at 168, 170.

1002

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 74:975

violators. Third, primary general deterrence, with counter-motivations in the form of fears of being caught, is the most important
element of prevention. Finally, primary general deterrence may be
closely followed in preventive influence by secondary general deterrence since the typical inside trader, an executive or professional, is
likely to be sensitive to possibilities of shame and loss of reputation73
and fearful of losing customers, clients, and employment opportunities. 74
The generalization that the probability of detection and, thus,
primary general deterrence (in which the probability of detection has
its clearest impact) will be most influential in preventing insider
trading is not surprising and probably does not distinguish the typical
inside trader from other violators. However, sensitivity to secondary
general deterrence may be an important distinguishing characteristic
of inside traders. Obviously, these general characteristics can be little
more than guidelines and more research and evidence would be
helpful.
The typical inside trader is motivated, presumably, by the desire
for some financial benefit that he can expect to receive with some
substantial probability. For purposes of analysis this motivation can
be divided into two parts: the benefit desired by the inside trader
and the probability that he will receive that benefit.
In insider rtrading, benefits take the general form of financial gain
or trading profits, but there are some variations. Broker-dealers and
analysts who selectively tip to their customers may be motivated by
financial gain, but such gain often comes indirectly in the form of
contented, regular customers. Motivations for financial gain may
vary in intensity depending upon whether the gain takes the form of
avoiding a potential loss or ensuring a possible gain. When an
insider is attempting to prevent a loss by selling out prior to an
expected drop in stock value, his motivations may be stronger than
when he is trading on an upswing in the hope of increasing his profits
from investment. 75 Whatever the form, however, the motivation to
be countered is the desire for wealth. 76
73. A survey of businesspeople produced evidence that their fear of imprisonment
stemmed from the danger to their reputations and the stigma that they associated
with imprisonment. M. CLINARD, THE BLACK MARKET 243-44 (1952), See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1972, at SO, col. 3 (late city ed.).
74. Baumhart, supra note 70, at 10.
15. Although, due to considerations of fairness, we probably would not want to
place stronger primary general deterrent penalties upon those trading in downswings
in order to offset the stronger motivation, secondary general deterrence might provide
the extra counter-motivation in those cases. An insider who trades before a slump
might be stigmatized more than one who traded on an upswing-something analogous
to the captain taking the only lifeboat on a sinking ship.
76. This fact alone suggests the counter-motivation most likely to be successful:
deprivation of wealth.
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The probability that the inside trader will receive his expected
benefit is in general quite high. The 16(b) definition of insider
trading, which requires both a sale and purchase or purchase and sale
for completion of the prohibited act, ensures that the trader will
receive the benefits when the prohibited act is carried out. For
example, if a corporate director purchases stock with the expectation
that it will rise in value and then sells the stock four months later, the
violation occurs only upon the moment of sale. At that moment, the
director knows precisely the amount of his profits and receives them
very soon thereafter. If those benefits are substantial it will be very
difficult to offset his motivation.
In the more broadly defined transactions falling under rule lOb-5,
the probability of benefit will vary and rarely will be as certain as in
the 16(b) context. Under rule l0b-5, the initial transaction completes the prohibited act. The realization of the benefits, however,
still depends upon the market's reacting as expected by the insider,
which of course can never be predicted by the offender with complete
certainty. Yet, a high probability of receiving the benefits can often
be expected by the offender due to the very nature of the information
used in making the decision to trade. Furthermore, the insider will
certainly be successful in making the initial transaction because ready
and willing "victims" exist. In other prohibited acts-burglary, for
example--,there is no willing exchange between the perpetrator and
the victim. In the context of insider trading, the open market provides a ready bargain and ensures a high probability of a successful
transaction and of final receipt of the benefits. 77 In many insider
trading cases, the market-injected uncertainty lowers not the probability of receiving positive benefits but only the probability of receiving
some exact amount of benefits. In such cases, the insider presumably
associates a range of benefits and probabilities with any transaction,
but can be virtually ce_rtain that his benefits will fall within that range.
In sum, the financial nature of the potential benefits and the
inside trader's, high probability of receiving those benefits create
strong motivations for an insider transaction and present a strong
challenge to any prevention scheme.
C.

Primary General Deterrence and Insider Trading

Most resource expenditures for the prevention of insider trading
have probably been made in the area of primary general deterrence.78
77. This may not be true with regard to the stock of small, closely held corporations.
78. Although resource expenditures on Fop and P in primary general deterrence
should theoretically also impact on socio-pedagogical influences and secondary general deterrence, these expenditures, in fact, have not been made in a manner to influence effectively the other two elements of prevention. See text at notes 142-44 in-

fra.
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Thus, resources have been devoted ,to the application of penalties

(e.g., fines, civil damages, injunctions, suspension of broker-dealer
registrations), to detection aids such as the numerous government
publications and the policing of the 16(a) reports, and to the various
private and SEC investigation and enforcement efforts.
This apparent high reliance upon primary general deterrence can
be justified for rtwo reasons. First, as noted above, the typical
potential inside trader is probably most strongly counter-motivated by
primary general deterrence. That is, a given resource allocation to
primary general deterrence (D1) will increase total counter-motivations (C) more than will an identical quantity of resources devoted to
secondary general deterrence or socio-pedagogical influences70 and
will thus make a larger contribution to the reduction of 1r ,to zero. 80
Second, the efficient creation of primary general deterrent punishments is facilitated in the insider trading context by the availability 6£
a penalty-the direct deprivation of economic gain-that can be
tailored to offset accurately the offender's benefit from offending.
Indeed, in 16(b) actions the offender's penalty-regurgitation of his
profits-automatically equals his benefit. The availability of this
remedy allows society to offset the offender's benefit without overexpending or underexpending resources-a result that occurs in applying penalties ,that poorly approximate the offender's benefits. Moreover, it means that the potential offender is likely to be strongly counter-motivated: He will expeot the penalty he receives to deprive him
of his benefits since he will expect the penalty to change in line with
any change in his benefits. It is more difficult in ,the context of other
offenses to design such automatically individualized punishments because it is impossible to determine whether, for example, five years of
imprisonment counters the gains from ,three years of embezzlement
either for the typical offender or for a particular offender.
Different approaches have been taken to the creation of primary
general deterrent counter-motivations in the 16(b) and lOb-5 contexts. Accordingly, it is possible to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of these approaches to primary general deterrence by examining
the past experience.

-1. Section J6(b):

The Costs of Total Reliance

The enforcement of section 16(b) has relied almost solely, and
79. This is particularly true if the resources are applied to detection efforts since
the probability of detection is particularly influential to a businessperson. See text
at notes 70-71 supra.
80. However, this does not necessarily justify the a11ocation of a11 prevention resources to D 1• If the marginal return to resources employed in D 2 and D 8 is positive, and if diminishing marginal returns to resources devoted to D 1 is assumed, then
at some point a greater increase in C can be obtained by shifting resources to D 2
and 0 8 •

I
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quite effectively,81 on primary general deterrence. It has done so,
however, only at significant cost.
The effectiveness of primary general deterrence in 16 (b) cases
can be seen by e:ir:aroinine equation (15) witb.oull: ithe variables for
secondary general deteDrence and socio-pedagogical influence:
'Ir = Fb • B [k(Fod • Foe)P]
(16)
The probability of receiving the benefits (Fb) will be nearly equal
to one since, as noted above, the 16(b) offense does not occur until
both the purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) take place. Since
the penalty for violating 16(b) is equal to the amount of the offender's benefit, P = B. Consequently we have
0

= =
'Ir

(17)

B - k(Fod • Foe)B

which reduces to

=

(18)
B[l - k(Fod · Foe)]
Clearly, if k(Fod • Foe) = 1 (that is, if -the perceived probability of
punishment is equal to one), the right hand side will reduce to zero
and sufficient counter-motivations will theoretically have been supplied by primary general deterrence. 82
The probability that an offender will be punished, (Pod · Foe), for
a 16 (b) violation has been brought very close to one through a
combination of procedural and reporting techniques. The publication of the section 16(a) mandatory reports of all sales and purchases
by insiders of their companies' securities, coupled with the allowance
of attorney fees in 16(b) actions, has provided the means and the
incentive for private detection of 16(b) violations and has thus raised

0

81. Some commentators, however, have argued that section 16(b) has not been
successful. See H. MANNE, supra note 51, at 163-64; Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A
New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CoRNELL L. R.Bv. 45, 64 (1968); Comment, Section 16(b): Re-evaluation ls Needed, 25 U. MIAMI L R.Bv. 144, 159
(1970). Others believe that section 16(b) has had precisely the deterrent effect that
its framers intended. See L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1043; W PAINTER, supra note
47, at 16, 25. The specific definition of insider trading in section 16(b) has been
successful in deterring that very specific type of violation. The section has certainly
prevented trading based on inside information that has only a short-lived effect on
market prices. Surely the specific language of section 16(b) cannot be expected to
prevent insider trading in general.
82. Equation (18) in the text then becomes
0 = B[l - 1 • 1] = 0
and the net benefit has been reduced to zero. This assumes k
1, i.e., that levels
of communication were such that business executives knew the probabilities and penalties under section 16(b). However, k
1 is plausible since procedures that result
in high probabilities were either clear on the face of the statute or were made clear
in early enforcements. Since hundreds of insiders report under section Hi(a), it is
likely that they are apprised of the outline and extent of section 16(b). See SEC,
OFFICIAL SUMMARY OF SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND HOI.DINGS (1935-1975). Publicity given to early cases also serv~d to reinforce the business community's awareness of the statutory provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 21, 1965, at 63, col.
4 (late city ed.).

=

=
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Fod to nearly one. 83 The probability of enforcement following discovery (Foe) is essentially equal to one since the mechanical six.month rule and the lack of a scienter requirement have eased the
burden of proof and since the allowance of derivative actions and of
generous counsel fees 84 has ensured a large pool of willing plaintiffs.
In short, Fod and Foe are both very close to one in the 16 (b)
context. This fact and the fact noted above, that the typical inside
trader is likely to be susceptible to high Fod and Foe probabilities, BG
explain the success of primary general deterrence in the 16(b) context.
The 16(b) success in using only primary general deterrent countermotivations, however, has in several respects been achieved only at
substantial cost. First, the mechanical six-month rule, which has
created a high Fod and Foe, excludes many individuals who engage
in undesirable insider trading from the reach of section 16(b). An
insider's use of inside information is no less unfair simply because he
did not use it in a quick six-month purchase and sale transaction.
Section 16(b) could have avoided a six-month limit in favor of
prohibiting insider trading whenever it occurs.
Second, costs result from the lack of any requirement in 16(b)
that defendants have actually used inside information in their transactions. While the lack of such a requirement has doubtless raised Fod
and Foe, the result is -that persons totally innocent of actual abuse of
inside information are caught in the rigid rule of 16(b) and are
forced to regurgitate honestly acquired profits and expend substantial
sums on legal fees. 86 This practice is costly to society, as well as to
the individual defendants, for it absorbs prevention resources that
could better be expended on prosecuting those outside the reach of
16(b) who abuse inside information.
Third, the simplified problems of proof and the automatic allowance of attorney fees have encouraged a group of plaintiffs' attorneys
to follow a practice bordering upon champem:y that is highly undesir83. There is obviously an incentive not to file section 16(a) reports if one has
traded, and the SEC has only recently threatened to impose sanctions on delinquent
filers. See Wall St. J., March 7, 1973, at 21, col. 4 (eastern ed.). In many companies, however, internal company pressures applied by in-house counsel may force
the insider to file. There is therefore reason to believe that that Fo4 is still close
to one. If the statute of limitations were changed or interpreted to run from the fil.
ing of the section 16(a) report rather than from "the date such profit was realized,"
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), at least one incentive for not filing would be removed.
See Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
84. See text at notes 55-59 supra.
85. See text at note 71 supra.
86. The judicial development of a pragmatic approach to section 16(b) cases,
wherein courts look for actual abuse of inside information, see, e.g., Kem County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), is probably evidence
that innocent parties have been caught by the automatic application of the section,
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able87 and that has probably increased the litigation of borderline or
even frivolous cases.
2.

Rule 1 0b-5:

The Problems and Some Proposals

Rule l0b-5 avoids the rigid rules of section 16(b) and thereby
avoids many of the costs incurred by 16(b)'s attempt to maximize
Fod and Foe. Yet, while 10b-5 has avoided these costs, it has
encountered other problems in its implementation of primary general
deterrence. This section considers these problems and suggests some
changes in resource utilization to alleviate them.
Primary general deterrence is frustrated in the 10b-5 context by
the imposition on an offender of penalties unrelated to the offender's
benefits from a violation. The tendency has been to impose unduly
harsh or unduly lenient penalties ranging from those that would
bankrupt most individuals and many corporations88 to virtually
meaningless injunctions or censures. 89 While the former penalties
may have a terrifying preventive effect, the latter penalties have more
often been applied. 90
The lack of correspondence between penalties and the offenders'
benefits stems principally from limitations upon the SEC, the- main
enforcement agency for rule 10b-5. This agency is limited in the
penalties it can dispense or seek through court action91 and thus has
been forced to rely heavily upon injunctions. Yet, since an injunction
obviously has no quality of automatic individualization to the violator's level of benefits, and indeed cannot be individualized, it is rarely
a useful penalty for primary general deterrence. When the insider
receives no benefits from offending, as in a pure tipper case,92 an
injunction may be appropriate as a remedy. The nonexistence of any
81. See Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); L. Loss, supra note 51, at 1053; W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 16.
88. See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 423, 427-29
(1968). The Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation involved almost 100 actions seeking millions of dollars in damages. See Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1969, at 15, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
89. See, e.g., Wall St. J., April 30, 1973, at 8, col. 2 (east.em ed.). The SEC
has recently recognized that a more comprehensive set of penalties is needed that are
not entirely "all-or-nothing" sanctions. See id. Jan. 28, 1972, at 2, col. 3 (eastern
ed.). See, e.g., id., June 11, 1974, at 2, col. 2 (eastern ed.) (censure rather than
injunction).
90. See, e.g., Wall St. J., May 29, 1973, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.); id., Sept. 29,
1972, at 5, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
91. The Commission may request a civil injunction against "acts or practices
which constitute or will constitute a violation or' the Exchange Act and may also
request the Department of Justice to begin a criminal prosecution. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). Administrative remedies
are also available, including expulsion of members from self-regulatory bodies, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(3) (Supp. 1976), and
censure of investment advisers, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp. 1976).
92. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1972, at 5, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
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present benefits in such a case avoids the need to formulate a penalty
that offsets the offender's benefits, and the injunction serves as a
future specific deterrent influence on the particular insider. When
the insider does benefit from offending, however, an injunction serves
virtually no primary general deterrent purpose as a penalty. A
potential inside trader will see no counter-motivation in the possibility
of being enjoined from doing something that, when the injunction is
imposed, he will already have done and may not plan to do again.
Since inside trading is normally triggered by unusual events in the life
of a corporation,93 events that may never reoccur, the potential inside
trader is unlikely to view an injunction as ever restricting his activities.
The threat of an injunction might serve as an effective countermotivation for members of the financial and investment communities
who engage in benefit-generating, inside trading violative of rule
l0b-5, but even among such offenders it is rarely an appropriate one.
When interpreted as a felony or misdemeanor conviction under 15
U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(l), an injunction serves to prohibit the offender's
association with any investment company, investment adviser, or
investment bank for ten years94 unless the offender receives an exemption from the SEC. 95 Since the injunction, when so interpreted and
when no exemption is granted, is a very substantial penalty, it should
be reserved for offenders who commit flagrant violations and receive
great benefits or for offenders who show a pattern of continuous
violation.
Fortunately, the SEC has been able to apply or have the courts
apply penalties that have a sufficient relation to the offender's benefits. A combination of injunctive relief and the regurgitation of the
offender's profits (or some approximation thereof) can successfully
offset the benefits of offending,96 much as under 16(b). In cases
involving broker-dealers, investment advisers, and affiliates of investment companies, penalties may take the form of injunctions coupled
with either registration suspensions or temporary prohibitions of association with any broker-dealer, investment company, investment ad93. These include mergers, tender offers, ore discoveries, or the creation of new
products. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843-44 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a)(l) (1970). Many insiders who are associated with
these members of the financial community will consent to injunctions that specifically state there is to be no inference of wrongdoing in order to avoid having been
"convicted." See, e.g., Wall St. J., June 4, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(c) (1970). See, e.g., Wall St. J., April 30, 1973, p. 8,
col. 2 (eastern ed.) (temporary exemption granted).
96. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 ( 1971) (injunctions issued; insider defendants paid their
profits into escrow fund for possible payment to investors); Wall St. J., Oct, 9, 1972,
at 4, col. 4 (eastern ed.) (two defendants ordered to disgorge profits of $28,000 and
$14,950; permanent injunctions against future violations issued),
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viser, etc. 97 Such penalties doubtless result in financial losses
for those upon whom they are imposed. If the length of the suspension and the consequent financial loss actually bear some relationship to the offender's benefits, these penalties may be sufficient counter-motivations without any regurgitation of profits to persons who may not actually have sustained a loss as a result of the
offense. Typically, however, suspensions are for twenty, thirty, sixty,
or ninety days, 98 which suggests that they are set with little if any
regard to the offender's financial gain. A suspension for a period of
time calculated to offset the offender's gain through lost salary or lost
business profits would be more effective in terms of primary general
deterrence and would require virtually no additional enforcement
resource expenditures.
Enforcement of rule lOb-5 is conducted by private individuals as
well as by the SEC. The penalties resulting from private enforcement, however, also frequently bear little relation to the offender's
benefit and thus show little concern for effective, efficient prevention.
Many of the penalties are related more to the plaintiff's loss than to
the defendant's gain, which may be desirable in terms of redressing
legitimate injuries but which is inefficient in terms of primary general
deterrence. If the suit takes the form of a derivative action with the
damage recovery going to the corporation whose stock has· been
traded, a penalty equal to the offender's profits is appropriate. 99
However, suits are also brought by investors demanding lost opportunity damages equal to the gains they might have made by trading in a
market in which the inside information was widely known. 100 The
recovery in such suits could be huge and could bear no relationship to
the offender's financial gains. 101 For prevention purposes, these
huge penalties are likely to be no more effective than penalties that
simply offset the offender's benefits (assuming that all offenders are
91. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(h) (Supp. 1976); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b)(2)
(1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(e) (Supp. 1976).
98. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (20 days); N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1973, at 38, col. 5 (late city ed.) (20 days); Wall St. J., June 4, 1973, at
3, col. 1 (eastern ed.) (60 days).
99. Some approximation of profits is obviously also appropriate. See, e.g., Wall
St. J., May 14, 1974, at 21, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
100. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In this case, the investors who had sold after a mis•
leading disclosure lost the opportunity for substantial profits when the market skyrocketed after a complete disclosure. The court awarded them the gain in stock value
they might have relized in the first few days. 446 F.2d at 105. Any investor who
traded in the market while the insiders were trading may be able to claim this remedy. See Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal Securities Laws:
The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 872, 894
(1967).
101. Of course, if the remedy were equivalent to benefits, each investor might receive only a fraction of a cent for each share he traded. See generally 2 A. BROM. BERG, SECURITIES LAW§ 7.6(e) (1974).
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penalized),102 while the prospect of such damages serves as an incentive to much litigation at substantial social costs.103
There are two additional aspects to the problem of setting penalties so that they offset the offender's benefit from offending. The
first deals with selection of the minimum penalty that should be
demanded by the SEC in the settlement of an enforcement action.
Decreasing the penalty in settlements decreases the efficacy of prevention since some individuals might, as a result, conclude that
they will retain some of their benefits from offending even if they
are detected. Against this decline in preventive efficacy, however,
must be weighed the preventive value of detecting and prosecuting
other offenders with the resources freed by settling some cases prior
to any lengthy hearings. Obviously, the final penalty settled upon is
a matter of negotiation and will vary among individual cases. However, the SEC, in an attempt to settle, should lower penalties only to
the point where the decrease in preventive efficacy caused by the
decrease in the severity of the penalty is roughly offset by the gain in
prev~ntive influence from employing freed enforcement resources to
increase the probability that some enforcement will occur. It is not
clear whether this balancing is presently being done by the SEC. 104
The other aspect to the problem of setting penalties deals with the
increased purchase by insiders of insurance policies that pay both
legal fees and damage awards if the holder is found to have violated
rule l0b-5. 105 These policies may be purchased by corporations fo.r
their executives. If such purchases of insurance are allowed, the
deterrent value of two counter-motivations-primary general deterrence and, in the form of legal fees, secondary general deterrencewill be nuliified. 106 An investment of SEC resources to effect the
102. That these huge penalties are likely to be superfluous is shown here. It has
been shown that
11'
Fb • B -[Fpp • Pl
Even if these penalties are only three times the benefits, i.e., P
3B, and even if
the perceived probability of punishment, FPP, is only one half the probability of benefit, i.e., F
the effects of primary general deterrence will be superfluous, without

=

=

2,

even considering the other preventive influences:
1r
1r

= FB • B - ~ • (3B)
= FB • B - 3/2 (Fb • B)
= FB • B [1 -3/2]
= -1/2 (Fb • B)
1r

1r

103. See Note, supra note 63, at 939.
104. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 2, 1973, at 38, col. S (late city ed.); id., Nov.
10, 1972, at 53, col. 1 (late city ed.); Wall St. J., May 14, 1974, at 21, col. 1 (eastern
ed.); id., June 4, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (eastern ed.). Although exact measurements cannot, of course, be made, some effort at analytical judgments should be attempted.
105. See Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (eastern ed.).
106. It is not clear whether insurance and indemnification by the corporation is

April 1976]

Allocation of Prevention Resources

1011

passage of legislation prohibiting indemnification and insurance, at
least with respect to damage awards, would therefore be worthw~ile.
Even apart from the penalty problems, primary general deterrence in the 10b-5 context is frustrated by the great difficulty of
maintaining the probability of detection and, to a lesser degree, the
probability of enforcement at high or even minimally adequate levels.
While this difficulty is inherent in the secretive nature and ill-defined
reach of the offense, there are, as discussed below, resource allocations and reallocations society can make that would ameliorate the
problem.
It is extremely difficult in the l0b-5 context to induce in potential
offenders any substantial expectation of detection. Insider trading is
very hard to notice unless conducted on a large scale since market
traders are willing to become unknowing victims. Consequently,
constant vigilance and investigation is necessary just to know that a
prohibited trade has occurred, let alone to determine the identity of
the insider. The probability of detection under rule lOb-5 is apparently much lower than under 16 (b), where the detection problem was
virtually removed by the reporting requirements of section 16(a).107
Since no regulation or reporting form automatically brings violations
to public attention, those enforcing lOb-5 must rely on the natural
workings of the market. When insiders are trading a particular stock
in any significant volume, the market price of the stock rises or falls.
Accordingly, any market movement that precedes the announcement
of some particular corporate occurrence creates grounds for investigation of possitsle insider trading. The SEC regularly depends upon
these triggering events. 108 But, in the case of large corporations with
many shareholders, insider trading volume might not be heavy
enough to cause detectable market movement. Thus, the SEC might
not perceive that investigation was necessary.
Discovery of the specific identity of the inside traders is an
additional task even when the offending activity has been clearly
legal. See Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153,
1157-58; Comment, Insider Indemnification and the Supremacy Clause: The Three
Faces of Fraud, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 523, 543 (1968); Comment, Insuring Corporate
Executives Against Liability Under I0b-5: First Principles and Second Thoughts, 63
Nw. U. L. REV. 544, 563 (1968).
107. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1973, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (36 per cent
drop in stock prices in two days followed by the disclosure of disappointing quarter);
id., Oct. 24, 1972, at 4, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (drop in prices before a release disclosing
drop in earnings); id., Aug. 15, 1972, at 3, col. 2 (eastern ed.); id., Jan. 24, 1972,
at 5, col. 1 (eastern ed.) (stock price jumped from $7 to $26 followed by disclosure
of merger plans). Cf. 72 FoRTIJNE 69, 70 (1965) (two contradictory press releases
triggered Texas Gulf Sulphur investigation). See generally Ferrara, SEC Division
of Trading and Markets: Detection Investigation and Enforcement of Selected
Practices That Impair Investor Confidence in the Capital Markets, 16 How. L.J. 950,
980-81 (1971).
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detected. The section 16(a) reporting forms can be helpful in
detecting trades violative of lOb-5 by those insiders required to
complete the forms, and new computerization methods may soon
permit the SEC to obtain information on trades by insiders on the
very day that they are made. 109 However, there are still substantial
possibilities for evading detection through the use of "street names"
and secret accounts. 110 The SEC is now trying to increase the
probability of detection by implementing new enforcement policy recommendations.111 Efforts are also being made to conscript professionals associated with corporations and the financial world, such as
lawyers and accountants, to serve as unofficial investigators under
fear of sanctions. 112 Unfortunately, however, the objective probability of detection in the lOb-5 setting is still low.
It has been less difficult to maintain a reasonably high probability
that 1Ob-5 violations, once detected, will be followed by successful
enforcement efforts. Enforcement mechanisms under 1Ob-5 are less
automatic than under 16(b);113 thus, the probability of enforcement
of lOb-5 violations does not approach one. Yet, a significant probability of enforcement (Foe) has been developed through the creation
of incentives for private enforcement and through the enlargement of
the class of potential enforcers.
Two occurrences expanded the resource base available for enforcement of lOb-5 violations. One was the judicial inference of a
private· right of action under 1Ob-5, 114 which allowed private traders
to supplement SEC enforcement efforts and increased the probability
that someone, the SEC or an investor, would bring an enforcement
action following the discovery of a violation. 115 The other was the
abandonment of the privity requirement. 116 Privity in securities
transactions had tended to be very difficult to establish, particularly
when sales on national exchanges were involved. The abandonment
of the requirement therefore drastically increased the possible plaintiff
class in a given situation by including any investor trading on the
market in the same stock and at the same time that the offender was
trading. This change, combined with the move toward less stringent
109. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 63, col. 5 (late city ed.).
110. See H. MANNE, supra note 45, at 163,
111. See SEC, ADVISORY CoMM, ON ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES, RE•
PORT (1972),
112. See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers,
49 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 437 (1974); Wall St. J,, July 12, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.).
Some of these professionals are responding. See id. June 28, 1974, at 8, col. 1 (east•
ern ed.).
113. See text at notes 83-84 supra.
114. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 2.4(1), at 27 & n.47 (1974).
115. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,432 (1964).
116. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 8.5(511), at 207; 1 id. § 2.5(3), at
43.
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reliance requirements, 117 has enabled plaintiffs to join together in
class action suits and thereby overcome resource barriers to bringing
enforcement actions.
Along with recognizing a broader class of enforcement agents, the
law under 10b-5 developed in a manner that implicitly provided
incentives for individuals to bring private causes of action. Problems
of proof, which had always been difficult in insider trading cases,118
were eased. 119 This relaxation created a greater likelihood that a
plaintiff would win an enforcement action and thus that he would be
induced to bring it initially. Moreover, courts began to allow substantial damage recoveries and some attorney fees, 120 which made the
investment of time and resources by the plaintiff and his counsel far
more attractive. As a result of these developments, it is today very
likely that some action will be taken, by the SEC or an investor, once
a violation is detected.
Thus, the objective probabilities of detection and enforcement in
the lOb-5 area operate like an inverted funnel. Many cases never
enter the funnel because of the narrow neck created by the low
probability of detection. For those cases that enter the funnel,
however, the probability of enforcement is substantial; thus, the
funnel widens. It is significant that this relatively high probability of
enforcement is apt to remain high even if the probability of detection
increases and more offenders enter the enforcement process. In the
normal case involving a fixed amount of resources at the enforcement
stage, an increase in the probability of detection triggers a decrease in
the probability of enforcement since resources are unavailable to
bring actions against the additional offenders. In the 10b-5 context,
the prospect of liberal damage recoveries and the substantial class of
potential plaintiffs together create a readily available and expanding
pool of enforcement resources and ensure a continued high probability of enforcement.
Thus, increased prevention efficacy under rule 10b-5 is dependent upon an increase in the probability of detection. Society could
solve the problem by devoting more resources to the detection of
lOb-5 violators. Alternatively and probably less costly, however, society could increase the communication factor, k, and thereby increase
the probability as perceived by potential offenders. Members of the
business and financial communities spend much of their time absorbing information and are relatively susceptible to media messages. 121
117. See note 65 supra; 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 8.6, at 209. Reliance
is implied in many cases through a finding of materiality. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
118. See, e.g., Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231,235 (2d Cir. 1943).
119. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 101, § 2.5(4), at 44.2.
120. See id. §§ 11.7, 913 (1968).
121. "In an institution as naturally jittery as the stock market, publicity can be
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This characteristic of potential 10b-5 offenders suggests the possibility
of raising the perceived probabilities of detection and enforcement
above the objective ones.
A well-developed business media exists to facilitate direct communication to potentially all inside traders in the business and financial communities. Members of these communities depend heavily
upon data and information concerning businesses, markets, and
trends and can be expected to read the appropriate newspapers and
magazines with care. This factor distinguishes insider trading from
many prohibited acts where no consistent exposure to the media
necessarily exists. Furthermore, members of the business and financial communities often read more than one of the several business
newspapers and periodicals. Since a single news story or announcement is often carried by most of the publications, a potential inside
trader may have multiple exposure to the fact that a particular
enforcement has occurred. 122 In short, the communication system to
potential inside traders is well developed and needs no additional
investment of resources. By using this excellent system of communication in a consistent and effective manner, the SEC can and app~arently has created the appearance of a higher probability of detection
than actually exists. The SEC's announcement of large numbers of
investigations and actions has led to the superstition that SEC investigators lurk everywhere. 123 These publications have been particularly
effective with respect to Wall Street broker-dealers, but corporate
insiders too are faced with headlines reading "SEC watchmen prowl a
new beat"124 or "New blast on inside information."12 1S
Thus, the SEC has to date made reasonably good use of the
communication system. To increase the perceived probability of
detection it should augment its communication efforts in that area.
The one caveat is that the SEC should exercise caution in publicizing
unsuccessful enforcement actions and actions resulting in virtually
a very potent weapon. This week, the Securities & Exchange Commission moved
against stock tips in the most sensational way possible when it charged Merrill Lynch .
. • ." Bus. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1968, at 19.
122. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1972, at 46, col. 4 (late city ed.); Wall St.
J., Aug. 15, 1972, at 3, col. 2 (eastern ed.).
123. Scarcely a day passes but that the SEC publishes the details of the revocation of a broker-dealer registration.
The cumulative effect of these actions-accentuated by the widespread publicity they received-has created an atmosphere in Wall Street that contains an
element of fear. By its constant bustle of activity, the Commission has managed
to nurture the Wall Street superstititon that there is an SEC investigator lurking
around every comer.
Phalon, The SEC vs. Wall Street, 81 DUN'S REV. & MODERN INDUS. 56, 57 (1963).
Analysts, executives, and investors broke all sales records in purchasing Record Press
reprints of the SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. court of appeals opinion. Wall St.
J., Aug. 19, 1968, at 5, col. 3 (eastern ed.); Note, supra note 63, at 860.
124. Bus. WEEK, May 7, 1966, at 53.
125. Bus. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1968, at 19.
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meaningless penalties, for such actions have ambiguous effects on the
perceived probabilities of enforcement. 126
With regard to primary general deterrence in the l0b-5 context,
then, major efforts are needed to raise the probability of detection, to
design better and more consistent penalties, and to communicate
carefully and forcefully. The first area of effort will require significant new allocations of resources, but, since a low probability of
detection serves as a bottleneck to returns on the use of other enforcement resources, 127 such expenditures are important. Careful communication directed at the perceived probability of detection may be
capable of inducing a portion of the needed increase. The other two
points of needed attention suggest solutions involving more of a
qualitative change in the use of resources than massive additional
resource input.
D.

Socio-Pedagogical Influence and Insider Trading

The efficacy of socio-pedagogical influences in the prevention of
insider trading is an area needing serious attention. Socio-pedagogical influences have been slow to develop and are still of limited
effectiveness, largely due both to society's failure to invest in the
necessary underlying norms years ago and to the uncertainty that has
surrounded the definition of prohibited insider trading.
In the insider trading context, socio-pedagogical influences and
the underlying norms are weak due to the inherent difficulty of
developing such norms, in the business community as well as in the
general public, for economic legislation and business regulation. This
difficulty is in turn due to the fact that the undesirability of activities
covered by economic legislation, including insider trading, stems not
from its immorality but rather from its unfairness-like playing poker
with a marked deck. Unfairness does not develop fee~gs of
126. On the one hand, startling enforcements such as Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), may have a preventive
influence whether or not the SEC prevails: "Regardless of the outcome of the
[Merrill Lynch] case, the fact that the action was taken has served notice on Wall
Street that the SEC is not going to tolerate the misuse of inside information to the
detriment of the small investor. There are indications that the practice already has
been drastically curtailed, which means the little guy already is benefiting." Robards,
Texas Gulf Sulphur, Merrill Lynch and All That, 123 MAGAZINE OF WALL Sr. Dec.
7, 1968, at 29, 40. But many SEC enforcements do not result in real penalties. See,
e.g., Wall St. J., June 11, 1974, at 2, col. 2 (eastern ed.) (censures); id., June 5, 1973,
at 2, col. 2 (eastern ed.); id., May 29, 1973, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (consent
decrees). These "nonenforcements" might actually lower the perceived probability
of enforcement. For prevention purposes, the use of resources to investigate and begin an action under these circumstances is wasted and highly inefficient. Of course,
there may be other policies that in a particular case would call for lenient treatment.
But the regular occurrence of meaningless penalties belies this justification, particularly when couched vaguely in terms of the public interest.
127. See text at note 42 supra.
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"wrongness"-norms-as successfully as do overtones of immorality.
The difficulty is compounded in the insider trading context because
there is no agreement that insider trading is even unfair or harmful to
market integrity. Henry Manne, for example, in his book Insider
Trading and the Stock Market, argues that insider trading is a facilitator of more efficient markets and hence should not be prohibited. 128
The SEC seems to picture the prevention of insider trading as
essentially an effort to protect the sanctity of the market-a purpose
less conducive to norm development than a purpose framed in terms
of the protection of personal property. Clearly, this barrier to norm
development could be mitigated by developing the view that insider
trading is very much like theft, a view gaining support in Great
Britain.129
There is little empirical proof that socio-pedagogical influences
can be developed. However, it is theoretically possible to develop
such influences, 130 and there is evidence that some influences presently
exist for insider trading131-an activity that was perfectly l~gal
forty-one years ago. In a survey conducted by The Annalist in 1915,
all but a few of the corporate directors questioned felt that the use of
inside information for personal profit was perfectly acceptable. One
surveyed individual estimated that ninety per cent of all businessmen
at that time perceived insider trading as ethically sound.132 It is not
clear how drastically this view has changed. In 1961, only forty to
sixty per cent of the business executives who were asked a series of
questions concerning their ethical beliefs said that they were willing to
trade on inside information. 133 While it seems likely that this trend
toward greater disapproval among businessmen has continued,134 the
over-all change is not tremendous. Yet the present weakness of
socio-pedagogical norms and the lack of concrete evidence that they
are easily developed does not necessarily counsel against the allocation of more resources to their development: Few resources have
been invested to date to develop even the present weak norms, and
changes may not require substantially greater resource outlays. Fur128. H. MANNE, supra note 45.
129. Although insider trading is legal in Great Britain, it has been referred to
as "legalized larceny." See Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.).
130. See E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 34, at 59; Ball & Friedman, Tlze Use of
Criminal Sanctions in t/ze Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological
View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197,220 (1964).
131. See Hetherington, Insider Trading and tlze Logic of tlze Law, 1967 WIS, L.
REV. 720, 733.
132. See THE ANNALIST, July 19, 1915, at 65. In his narrative of nineteenthcentury Wall Street, Henry Clews speaks in almost glowing terms of insiders who
sold their companies' stock on the basis of nonpublic information and criticizes not
the insiders, but the public who did not wait for further information. H. CLEWS,
TwENIY-EIGHT YEARS IN WALL STREET 202-03 (1888), See also F. PECORA, WALL
Snum:r UNDER OATII 152-61 (1939).
133. Baumhart, supra note 70, at 16.
134. See generally Hetherington, supra note 131, at 735-36.
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therm.ore, norms developed in an effort to engender socio-pedagogical
influences will indirectly yield substantial benefits in the form of
secondary general deterrence. 135
Early regulation of insider trading under lOb-5 and 16(b) did
not employ resources in a manner most conducive to the development
of socio-pedagogical influences or the necessary underlying norms.
The statutory prohibitions either covered only some instances of
abuse of inside information or were characterized by uncertain dimensions. Consequently, the socio-pedagogical message, M, was
incomplete, uncertain, and uninfluential, and the growth of the necessary norms was stunted.
A comprehensive definition of the prohibited activity was never
clearly stated in the case of insider trading but was instead allowed to
·develop haltingly over time. Until 1947, only those abusive uses of
inside information within section 16 (b) even appeared to be prohibited. In that year, rule l0b-5 was interpreted in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co. 136 to apply to insider trading, but its reach was limited
to a narrow range of insider transactions-those in which one party in
a face-to-face transaction failed to disclose important information
affecting the value of the stock.137 Because insider trading was
never unequivocally branded as a prohibited activity during this early
period, and because the extent of the prohibition was never clearly
stated, the rankings Re and RP, which served as the content of the
socio-pedagogical message, were very low. While vigorous enforcement efforts and significant penalties were the order for the shortswing type of insider trading, other abuses of inside information were
left untouched. As a consequence, the average penalty and enforcement levels for insider trading as a whole138 were low: The high
levels under 16(b) were averaged with zero levels for other abuses of
inside information. Thus, society actually conveyed the message
during this earlier period that it did not view insider trading as
particularly undesirable.
Even the vigorous enforcement efforts and consistently designed
and applied penalties under 16(b) were not as conducive to the
development of norms during this period as they might have been.
Section 16(b) was limited to sales and purchases within a six-month
period, required both a purchase and a sale, and, thus, was based on
an arbitrary rule that did not distinguish between wrongdoing and
totally innocent exchanges. Such a detailed statutory structure failed
to convey any strong feelings of "wrongness" since the activities it
prohibited were little different from some of the activities it did not
135.
136.
137.
138.

See text at notes 123-54 infra.
83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa.).
83 F. Supp. at 614.
See note 35 supra & accompanying text.
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prohibit. Clearly, a much stronger message would have been generated had the 16(b) scheme separated the wrongdoing from the
innocent activities. 139
In the last decade, much has been done to strengthen the sociopedagogical message. The reach of rule 10b-5 has been extended so
that virtually all wrongful insider trading is prohibited. Dramatic
and highly publicized enforcements, such as Texas Gulf Sulphur140
and Merrill Lynch, 141 and an increase in the number of litigated cases
of insider trading have presumably caused an increase in the Ro
factor communicated to the public, while large judgments for plaintiffs have presumably increased Rp. If this message is maintained
over a significant period of time, socio-pedagogical influences associated with insider trading should gradually increase. Yet, one impediment to the maximization of socio-pedagogical influences remains
-the substantial uncertainty that still surrounds the reach of rule
lOb-5. 142 Judicial opinions that increase the clarity of rule lOb-5
will doubtless contribute to the development of socio-pedagogical
influences. A better means of reducing the uncertainty would be to
codify the last forty years of legal developments into a new statutory
scheme of regulation for insider trading. 143 Such a scheme would
probably not require the expenditure of additional enforcement_ resources.
Several lessons can be learned from this experience with the
development of socio-pedagogical influences in the area of insider
trading. One is the desirability of avoiding statutes like 16(b) that
lump together innocent and wrongful activity and that prohibit some
but not all wrongful activity of a particular type. A second lesson is
139. This conclusion suggests that the general conceptual formulation for the socio-pedagogical message, M
k(R. + R.), must be modified in specific models to
take account of enforcement resource allocations or penalties that are not capable of
conveying "wrongness." This alteration could be made by discounting or lowering
the rankings.
140. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1968).
141. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 49S F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974).
142. See W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 394-9S.
143. The American Law Institute bas attempted such a codification. See FED•
ERAL SECURmES CODE§§ 1303, 1402, 1413 (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973). One
commentator has stated:
The question is simple: Insider trading must be regulated. The only problem
is how. It is now being done in polyglot fashion through disciplinary and, more
recently, restitutional proceedings, accompanied by judicial development of an
entire common law of Rule lOb-5 governing the nghts of private litigants. But
we have reached a point where corporate officials, shareholders and potential investors, insiders and outsiders alike, are entitled to more explicit language in the
statute, the only ultimate reflection of the democratic process of representative
government. This does not rule out the possibility, even the desirability, of further rule-making powers being given to the Commission to elaborate the statutory intent.
W. PAINTER, supra note 47, at 394-9S (footnotes omitted).

=
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that vague prohibitions like lOb-5 are less efficient generators of
socio-pedagogical influences than more certain statutes of similar
breadth. Socio-pedagogical influences are developed essentially by
the resources expended on primary general deterrence. In allocating
these resources, first priority should be given to maximizing primary
general deterrence since that element of prevention is most influential.144 Agencies should, however, consider socio-pedagogical influences in making allocation decisions, and they should avoid devising
statutory and enforcement schemes that frustrate the development of
such influences.

E.

Secondary General Deterrence and Insider Trading

Much of the above discussion concerning inadequate norm investment is applicable also to secondary general deterrence, for the norms
that must be developed to trigger socio-pedagogical influences also
serve as the basis for secondary general deterrence. The strength and
consistency of norms .necessary to support socio-pedagogical influences, however, may be substantially greater than that required to
induce individuals to impose secondary costs.
Strong norms are required to prevent or help prevent an individual
from engaging in some activity that he expects will benefit him
personally. Weaker norms, however, may be adequate to induce the
general public to shun an individual, to refuse to employ him, or to
doubt his reputation for honesty and integrity. To induce these
secondary costs, norms need not overcome strong motivations of selfinterest; indeed, compliance with the norms may be synonymous with
self-interest. For example, a businessman who personally views an
activity as only somewhat reprehensible may nevertheless dismiss
individuals under investigation or involved in litigation over this
prohibited activity in order to avoid any public appearance of impropriety among his employees. 145 Moreover, the failure to invest in
norms cannot diminish the effectiveness of those secondary costs that
are not imposed directly by other individuals. Attorney fees 146 and
lost income while involved in litigation or investigations will be
incurred by a violator even if other members of the community view
his action as proper.
Both substantial automatic secondary costs in the form of attorney
fees147 and a low threshold of norm strength necessary to support the
144. See text at note 71 supra.
145. See generally Baumhart, supra note 70, at 10.
146. The effectiveness of this secondary cost is impaired by any practice of allowing potential offenders to take out insurance policies that indemnify for attorney fees.
See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
147. Expectation of substantial attorney fees are extremely disconcerting and can
also induce settlements of SEC suits. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Jan 28. 1972, at 17, col.
1 (eastern ed.).
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creation of secondary counter-motivations have apparently made secondary general deterrence a viable and growing prevention force for
insider trading. Yet, the continued development of this element of
prevention will require effort and planning. Other than attorney fees
and expenditures of time and effort, secondary costs seem to take the
form of fears of job dismissals,148 ruined careers,149 and general harm
to reputations. 159 Potential offenders will expect these costs only if
those in positions to impose them agree with the spirit of the law. In
the general model, it was implicitly assumed that there existed individuals with the desired norms standing ready to impose these secondary
costs on violators or alleged violators-that is, that the imposition of
secondary costs depended only upon Fod• This assumption-that
simply detecting a violation will result in the imposition of secondary
costs-must be altered in the context of insider trading.
Presumably, the potential inside trader today expects to incur
significant secondary costs only if his superiors and fellow executives
agree with the spirit of the prohibition or if he is associated with a
company or industry that is subject to public pressure and is concerned about its business image. 151 In applying the general model to
insider trading, therefore, it is necessary to change the (Fod Foe) • S
formula for secondary counter-motivations to (Fod Foe) (Ft) • S
where Ft represents the probability that a potential violator associates with individuals who will impose secondary costs.
If an inside trader does associate with individuals who are prepared to impose secondary costs, mere detection or investigation
(Fod) of his violation is apt to trigger those costs. 162 Thus, a

+

+

148. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1972, at 43, col. 4 (late city ed.) (individual
charged in suit for insider trading resigned); id., Dec. 14, 1972, at 73, col. 1 (late
city ed.) (Oppenheimer analyst immediately discharged for selectively disseminating
a report); id., April 23, 1965, at 1, col. 6 (late city ed.) (Commerce Department
aide resigned after buying Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on -a tip); Wall St. J., April 20,
1973, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.) (Equity Funding personnel forced to resign).
149. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1972, at 49, col. 4 (late city ed.) (individual
claimed his career was ruined as the first person convicted W1der a 30-year-old statute
prohibiting insider dealing in mutual funds).
150. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1972, at 47, col. 5 (late city ed.) (former
financial vice-president of Penn Central feared his silence would be interpreted as
guilt by friends and former associates); id., Jan. 5, 1972, at 50, col. 3 (late city ed.)
(security analysts group was concerned that splinter groups would violate insider trading rules and that these violations would be attributed to their group); Wall St. J,,
June 1, 1973, at 2, col. 4 (eastern ed.) (bank feared any settlement that would imply
wrongdoing); ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 111, at 45.
151. See Symposium, White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 817, 825
(1973 ).
152. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1974, at 1, 28, col. 3 (eastern ed.):
Even though such activities haven't been alleged on Mr. Langfields' part and
charges haven't been brought, the SEC investigation already has cost Mr. Langfield dearly. He had earned a $25,000-a-year salary at IDS; now he is collecting unemployment compensation and worrying about supporting his wife and
five children while paying mounting legal fees. His cabin cruiser, a relic of
flusher times, has been sold. "I'm really nervous about the future," he says, "be-
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potential inside trader cannot reasonably expect to avoid secondary
costs by conducting a good court battle or negotiating a consent
decree. Since secondary costs are influential for the typical potential
inside trader, 153 the fact that they are so easily triggered further
enhances their prevention efficacy.
Positive levels of secondary general deterrence, then, depend most
heavily both upon past norm development and upon the level of
resources devoted to the communication of violations. As discussed
above, the communication system in the area of insider trading does
not lack development, but only careful use. 154 The need for further
investment in norm development is identical to the need set forth in .
the discussion of socio-pedagogical influences except that a lesser
degree of development may suffice to support secondary general
deterrence alone.

F.

Conclusion

This Note has suggested several changes in the allocation of
resources to the prevention of insider trading, each of which would
affect one or more of the basic elements of prevention. First, resources should be expended to increase the probability of detection.
This change would most directly affect primary general deterrence
but is also an important triggering mechanism for secondary general
deterrence and a part of the message necessary to develop the norms
basic to secondary general deterrence and socio-pedagogical influences. Second, penalties should be redesigned so that they more
accurately offset the offender's benefits. This change would improve
primary general deterrence. Third, communication should be used
more carefully to increase the prevention efficacy of all three elements. Finally, a statutory scheme should be designed that would
use already committed resources more efficiently in communicating
messages for norm development and would thus influence both sociopedagogical influences and secondary general deterrence.
These reallocations should not be made, of course, unless the net
marginal benefit of a change is greater than or equal to zero, and they
certainly should not be made if the cost of prevention would then
exceed K*, the social harm associated with no prevention. Such
determinations require the exercise of judgment since exact measurecause trading is the only thing I know how to do, and these days I'm a leper
to the securities industry."
Mr. Langfield spends his time job hunting and writing poetry. He talks
about possibly starting a fast-food franchise or an ice-cream store. Last month,
to pick up some spare quarters, he bought five electronic game machines and
installed them in Minneapolis-area restaurants.
See sources cited in notes 148, 150 supra; ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 111,
at 18.
153. See text at note 73 supra.
154. See text at notes 121-25 supra.
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ments are impossible. But it would seem that these changes should
be made. Only the recommended increase in the probability of
detection requires substantial new resource expenditure; the other
changes are essentially qualitative improvements in the use of currently committed resources. Because each change is likely to have
multiple points of benefit, and because the bottleneck in detection is
presently decreasing the return on resources already committed to
other steps in the enforcement process, the benefits from the changes
are very likely to outweigh the costs.

